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PROMOTING PROGRESS THROUGH PERPETUAL
PROTECTION: THE STRUGGLE TO PLACE LIMITS
ON CONGRESS' COPYRIGHT POWER
Todd John Canni+
Why do we, the people, grant authors and inventors a limited period of
protection for their creations? Well, why do employers dangle large
bonuses in front of their employees? Primarily because if the employee
succeeds, so does the employer. The Framers similarly hoped that by
offering creative minds a reward for their labor, more artistic and literary
expression would occur, thereby enriching the public domain and
eventually encouraging more intellectual development and ingenuity
through the derivative use of original works It is the same principle that
underlies the bonus structure in employee-employer relationships.
Society benefits from the creativity or success of authors and inventors
just as employers benefit from the productivity of employees. The
underlying concept is that each party benefits from the other party's
contribution, and the result is a bargained-for exchange.2 The primary
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2004, The Catholic University of America School of Law.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 239-40 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
The text of the Copyright Clause explicitly states, "To Promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Although the Framers may have had goals in mind for their young country aside from
intellectual development, this is the only stated purpose in the text of the Copyright
Clause. Id. Based on this fact, inferentially, the Copyright Clause should not only be used
to further that goal, it should be used as an all-purpose power.
2. See Brief for Petitioner at 23, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-
618) ("Congress may make a trade-it may grant an 'exclusive Right' for a 'limited
Time[]' in exchange for a 'Writing' by an 'Author.' It may not handout a monopoly over
speech in exchange for nothing-quid pro nihilo. "). The Framers understood it this way,
which is why extensions are not even a consideration, either in the text of the clause or in
practicality. A retrospective extension gives an author or inventor something for nothing.
The Constitution only permits Congress to grant protection for creation, not protection
for nothing. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Employers offer incentives for their
employees to produce more than the expected. When the employee does so, he or she will
receive a one-time bonus. The following year, the employer will not give the employee a
bonus unless he or she produced more than expected. This sounds like common sense, but
Congress does not see it this way. Congress consistently has provided additional
retrospectice bonuses to authors and inventors despite the fact that they previously were
rewarded for their efforts. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999), affd 239
F.3d 372, and affd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (listing every
copyright extension since the federal government's first recognition of copyrights in 1790).
This clearly is in contrast with today's norms, where nothing is given for free. Based on
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objective is that intellectual and artistic masterpieces will forever
increase in the public domain.3
Unfortunately, this goal has become almost impossible to achieve.4
Decades of copyright extensions have shifted the focus of the copyright
power from promoting the creation of new works to protecting pre-
existing works.5 Most recently, Congress, in its pursuit to harmonize
United States law with European law, extended copyright protection
both prospectively and retrospectively.6  This essentially quashed any
hope of seeing many great works of literature enter the public domain
for at least another twenty years.7 Eric Eldred, an individual who
planned to make many of these literary masterpieces available on his
website for others to freely use, challenged the constitutionality of the
the text of the Copyright Clause, the current practice is in discord with the Framers'
intentions. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (citing
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). Chief Judge Hughes acknowledged
the copyright monopoly granted by Congress noting, "[t]he sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors." (emphasis added). This is the only
logical assumption. There could be no other reason for creating the Copyright Clause
than to encourage authors and inventors to create. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The
protection given merely was a means to an end, the end being artistic creation. See
Petitioner's Brief at 24, Eldred (No. 01-618) (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 557, at 402-03 (reprinted with introduction
by R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987)).
4. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affd sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The majority in Eldred identified all copyright extensions
since the first act of Congress in 1790. Id. (citing Act of Feb. 3, 1831 § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436;
Act of March 4, 1909 § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080; Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555 (1962); Pub.
L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581 (1965); Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464 (1967); Pub. L. No. 90-
416, 82 Stat. 397 (1968); Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360 (1969); Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84
Stat. 1441 (1970); Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490 (1971); Pub. L. No. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181
(1972); Pub. L. No. 93-573, title I, § 104, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-553 §§ 302-05,
90 Stat. 2541, 2572-76 (1976)). Successive copyright extensions make it extremely difficult
for the public domain to prosper. This is evidenced by the fact that many works scheduled
to enter the public domain will remain protected for at least an additional twenty years
because of the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
5. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 374 (listing all the copyright extensions). Increasing the
length of copyright protection has been a consistent effort over the last century. However,
the extension enacted by the 94th Congress, which ultimately expanded protection past
the life of the author, is the main reason that copyright protection has become widely
accepted. In order to make intellectual development the focus behind the copyright
power once again, there must be a revolutionary change in the term of protection granted
to authors and inventors. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF
THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 250 (2001). Until radical changes are made,
copyright protection will extend at the expense of the public.
6. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Title I, 112 Stat. 2827.
7. Id.
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Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA). Eldred argued that the
CTEA violated the "limited Times" provision of the Copyright Clause.9
After the district court and the court of appeals denied relief,10 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issues." After hearing
the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the CTEA
and against the public domain."
In delivering its opinion in favor of the CTEA, the Supreme Court
majority contributed little to resolve the controversy, and left many
questions unanswered. The majority stated, "it is not our role to alter the
delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve."' 3 Furthermore, "we
are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and
policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise
they may be."'4 Prior to the Court's ruling, the focus of this controversy
was the constitutional limits on Congress' exercise of its copyright
power. Specifically, the issues to be determined were whether
retrospective extensions really "promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and
useful [a]rts;,',6 whether Congress could perpetually extend copyright
8. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Eldred (No. 01-618). Eldred was one of the petitioners in
this case. The petitioners represent organizations and sole individuals who planned on
using many works that were due to enter the public domain before the CTEA was
enacted. Id. at 4-5. Eldred's website allows students and scholars to study literary works
in ways never imagined. Id. at 5. Users of his website are able to click on links which will
take them to other sites on the World Wide Web which discuss their area of interest in
more depth. Id. Essentially, Eldred is slowly constructing a library of public domain
works that would someday exceed the technological capacity of a traditional library. Id.
However, the CTEA changed his plans.
9. Id. at 11; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
10. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999); see also Eldred v. Reno, 239
F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
11. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). The petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of the CTEA arguing that it violated the "limited Times" provision of the
Copyright Clause. Id. at 775. Specifically, the Supreme Court was left to determine two
issues: first, whether the D.C. Circuit erred in holding that Congress has the power under
the Copyright Clause to enact retrospective extensions; and second, whether the CTEA
which extends copyrights prospectively and retrospectively is "categorically immune from
challenge[] under the First Amendment." See Petitioner's Brief at i, Eldred (No. 01-618).
12. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208.
13. Id. at 205 n.12 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)).
14. Id. at 208.
15. Petitioner's Brief at 1, Eldred (No. 01-618).
16. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress' primary rationale for enacting the CTEA
was the harmonization of U.S. law with that of the European Union. H.R. Rep. No. 105-
452, at 4 (1998). See S. Rep. No. 104-315, at 3 (1996) (granting U.S. authors equivalent
protection to that afforded authors in the European Union, Congress is ensuring that U.S.
authors will have the same amount of protection as European works, and will therefore
profit from the sale of those works outside the United States). See also Kristen Knudsen,
The Protection of James Bond and Other Fictional Characters Under the Federal
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protection through a string of incremental extensions; 17 and whether any
limits existed in Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause.
Before the Supreme Court released its opinion, it was unclear whether
the Court would resolve these issues.' 9 Without reading the majority's
Trademark Dilution Act, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 13, 21-22 (2000). See also
Petitioner's Brief at 22, Eldred (No. 01-618) ("Whatever else a monopoly protection under
[the Copyright Clause] may do, it must promote 'creative activity' to satisfy the limits of
the Constitution.") (quoting Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 429)). See S. Rep. No. 104-
315, at 30-32 (1996) (documenting Senator Hank Brown's statement that the Copyright
Clause should not be used to harmonize U.S. laws with those abroad). By examining the
text of the Copyright Clause, one can infer that harmonization should be more of the
byproduct of a copyright law intended to promote progress. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-452,
at 4 (1998). In addition to the harmonization rationale, several other secondary effects
were mentioned: providing additional incentives for authors to create new works;
providing an incentive to restore old works that have already received protection; and
enabling authors and inventors to pass on their financial earnings to their ancestors. Id.
However, the secondary goals stated are not likely to be widely accomplished through
retrospective extensions. The Copyright Clause was created for one purpose: "[t]o
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The
clause does not mention harmonization or that it may also serve as an all-mighty power.
See id. This is just another Congressional attempt to expand the scope of a limited power
well beyond its intended purpose. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see
also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Why doesn't Congress try to
harmonize U.S. law with the Constitution before it worries about harmonizing it with
other countries? See S. Rep. No. 104-315, at 31-32 (1996). Senator Hank Brown stated
that the CTEA does not harmonize U.S. copyright law with that of other countries. Id. In
addition, he argued that the U.S. should not be concerned with the harmonization of U.S.
law to that of the European Union. Id. See also Petitioner's Brief at 43, Eldred (No. 01-
618) (Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights, testifying before Congress, stated that
the CTEA "does not completely harmonize our law with the [EU directive]. In some
cases, the U.S. term would be longer; in others the EU terms would be."). Research has
apparently revealed that a majority of copyright terms have not been harmonized. See Id.
(citing Dennis Karjala, Harmonization Chart, http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/HarmonizationChartDSKhtml (last visited July 27,
2003)).
17. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3. The court seems to think that Congress can
perpetually extend copyright protection through the facade of many limited extensions.
Id. The Supreme Court's failure to reject this conclusion on its face means that Congress
will have a blank check to extend protection infinitely, as long as the grant of infinity is
done in small increments. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It should be clear that the Copyright Clause imposes
limits on Congress. See id. However, the lower court in Eldred found that "[t]he
introductory language of the copyright clause does not limit [Congress'] power." Eldred v.
Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 n.6 (D.D.C. 1999) (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)). The court also stated that "[w]ithin the discretion of Congress, any fixed term
is a limited time because it is not perpetual. If a limited time is extended for a limited time
then it remains a limited time." Id. at 3 n.7. So, although express limitations exist in the
Copyright Clause, whether Congress needs to respect them remains unclear. Id.
19. See Petitioner's Brief at 4, Eldred (No. 01-618). Without answers, the controversy
surrounding copyright extensions, especially retrospective extensions, will continue,
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opinion, presumably a pro-CTEA decision meant that retrospective
extensions do promote progress; that Congress can perpetually extend
protection through a string of incremental extensions; and that Congress
has unlimited power in its use of the Copyright Clause. However, these
presumptions would be incorrect. Essentially, the only issue the
Supreme Court clarified was that Congress has unchecked authority in
the use of its copyright power. The majority's opinion does not offer
any guidance to Congress nor does it place any limitations on the use of
Congress' copyright power. For these reasons, the implications of this
decision are severe, and consequently may result in the transformation of
the copyright power into an all purpose power.
This Comment will first examine the historical events leading to the
enactment of the Copyright Clause. It will then identify the Framers'
purpose in creating the clause, namely, the promotion of the progress of
science and the useful arts. Next, this Comment will examine the string
of copyright extensions over the last 213 years, beginning with the federal
government's first recognition of copyright protection in 1790 and
concluding with the most recent extension in 1998. This Comment will
then follow Eldred v. Ashcroft on its journey to the High Court,
beginning with an analysis of the decision by the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia in 1999, its affirmation by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2001, and ultimately its
arrival at the steps of the Supreme Court in 2003. This Comment will
argue that the Supreme Court erred in upholding the lower courts'
decisions and failed to provide guidance to Congress in the use of its
copyright power. An analysis of the separate dissenting opinions by
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer will demonstrate the flawed reasoning
of the majority. Finally, this Comment will project the implications of
the Supreme Court's decision.
I. THE EVOLVING COPYRIGHT POWER AND CONGRESS' PURSUIT OF
UNLIMITED PROTECTION
A. The Roots of Copyright Law
The Framers understood the importance of developing and
maintaining an arsenal of artistic creation to further stimulate the
intellectual growth of their young country.21 The Framers carefully
causing much uncertainty for those hoping to use works scheduled to enter the public
domain.
20. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (stating that "it is generally for
Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives").
21. William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle
Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 911 (1997) (quoting 24 JOURNALS OF THE
2003]
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considered the best means by which to "[p]romote the [p]rogress of
[s]cience and the useful [a]rts."22 They knew that proper encouragement
would motivate authors and inventors to create and innovate, thereby
enriching the public's access to intellectual creations.
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 180 (1783)). It is important to recognize the deliberation that
went into the creation of the Copyright Clause in order to determine the meaning behind
the "limited Times" provision. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The most accurate way
to determine the appropriate length of protection to afford creators is to examine the first
copyright act of Congress in 1790. This act granted authors a maximum of twenty-eight
years of protection, but the renewal was only available to living authors. Act of May 31,
1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. This fact counters the contemporary argument that because
people live longer today, more protection should be granted. Although the Framers might
concede that longer terms of protection should accompany longer life expectancies, the
Framers would not concede to any protection lasting longer than the author's life. This
trend to extend protection, once the author is deceased, is more a gift to corporate owners,
than to authors' estates. See Disney Buys the Rights to Winnie the Pooh, N.Y. TIMES,
March 5, 2001, at C12 (stating that the Disney corporation benefits tremendously from this
extension). Statistics show that most of the copyrighted works ready to enter the public
domain are no longer earning royalties. See Petitioner's Brief at 7, Eldred (No. 01-618).
Only a small percentage of copyright holders actually benefit from copyright extensions.
Id. Congressional Research Service conducted a report that revealed that in order to give
50,000 copyrights additional protection, the CTEA blocked the public's access to 375,000
other works for at least twenty years. Id. This effect demonstrates that copyright
extensions are not beneficial for the public at large.
22. See Petitioner's Brief at 23-24, Eldred (No. 01-618). See also Patry, supra note 21,
at 911 (commenting on the Continental Congress' approach to enacting copyright
protections to foster creativity among artists) (quoting 24 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 180 (1783)). The Framers carefully crafted the Copyright
Clause, hoping to prevent its exploitation. See Petitioner's Brief at 23-24, Eldred (No. 01-
618). In creating the Copyright Clause, they spent much time examining the problems
faced in England. Id. See also ROBERT BLOOM & MARK BRODIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 13-14 (3rd ed. (2000)). The purpose
behind the adoption of the Fourth Amendment was to avoid the abuses of state supported
open-ended searches that occurred in England. Id. The provision requiring probable
cause before a warrant is issued evidences this concept. Id. The provision also limits the
scope of the search. Id. The Fourth Amendment also prohibits "unreasonable searches
and seizures." Id. Like with the interpretation of the "limited Times" provision of the
Copyright Clause, there has been much deliberation over the relationship between the two
separate clauses separated by the conjunction "and." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The
similarity between the creation of these two clauses of the Constitution demonstrates that
each and every word was carefully chosen and meant to be followed. The term "limited"
in the Copyright Clause is not open for broad interpretation. See id. It is evident that no
clear numerical limit can easily be determined, but the term granted was intended to be
only enough to encourage ingenuity. See id. Although in general the term "limited" may
mean 200 years, when placed in the context of the Copyright Clause, it should be clear that
the protection granted is merely a pretext to promoting progress. See id. The primary
goal of the Copyright Clause was for the public to benefit from the created works, after
they received a limited term of protection. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984). ("The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly, this Court has said, lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors.").
[Vol. 53:161
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The Framers drafted the Copyright Clause mindful of the problems
created in England by attempts to monopolize and successful
23
monopolization. With history in mind, the Framers "were not about to
give the Congress any general . . . nor any specific power to grant
monopolies" unless limitations were in place.24 The Framers anticipated
that businesses would, in "the spirit of monopoly," seek exclusive
privileges over existing inventions in order to maintain monopolies,• • 25
rather than invest time and capital into innovation. For this reason,
unlike England's Statute of Anne, the Copyright Clause gives Congress
the power to vest protection in authors, not publishers or "booksellers.
2 6
23. See Petitioner's Brief at 23-24, Eldred (No. 01-618). See also Edward C.
Waltersheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual
Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 334 (2000). The House of Commons, like the
Framers, debated extensively over the specific term limits to be granted. Id. The pinnacle
of concern in granting protection, was to make sure the system implemented would
encourage creation while at the same time it could prevent unrestricted monopolies and
restraints on trade. Id.
24. Petitioner's Brief at 24, Eldred (No. 01-618). See Waltersheid, supra note 23, at
340 (commenting on Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr. 2408 (1774)). In Donaldson, the House
of Lords overturned an earlier interpretation of the Statute of Anne that ignored the
statutory limitations finding that copyrights should remain in the hands of the creators.
The House of Lords held that "the Statute of Anne effectively limited the term for which
copyright could be enforced at common law to a maximum of twenty-eight years." Id.
25. Petitioner's Brief at 25, Eldred (No. 01-618) (citing Hall & Sellers, PA. GAZETTE,
Feb. 16, 1785, Item. No. 71221). (defining the "spirit of monopoly" as the tendency to
seek favors and economic protection in industry from the government instead of
competing through innovation and creativity). The brief states, "[t]he practice of granting
monopolies to industries already in existence had an obvious, and deleterious effect not
only on consumer welfare, but on incentives to innovate. The very possibility of securing
exclusive privileges was an invitation to those at court to join in the race for favors." Id. at
24 (citing WILLIAM HYDE PRICE, THE ENGLISH PATENTS OF MONOPOLY 16 (1906)).
The powerful businesses in existence did not compete for new inventions, but merely for
"monopolies in old industries." Id. The poor were left to innovate, while the rich got
richer. Id.
26. Petitioner's Brief at 26, Eldred (No. 01-618) (citing 8 Anne, ch 19, § 1 (1710).
Many years after the enactment of the Statute of Anne, England was finally able to restrict
the excessive abuses of the Crown's monopolistic practices and lessen the publishers'
stronghold on intellectual property. See Petitioner's Brief at 24 (citing EDWARD C.
WALTERSHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 95 (2002); see also Waltersheid, supra note 23, at 340. The
Framers drafted the Copyright Clause with the main goal of preventing monopolies from
corrupting the system as they did in England. See Petitioner's Brief at 23-24, Eldred (No.
01-618) (citing CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE
ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660-1800, 16 (1988)). The brief states that the Framers used
the pitfalls discovered through England's experience with copyright protection as a sword
in drafting the Copyright Clause. Id.
2003]
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B. The Framers Enact the Copyright Clause
In 1783, after encouragement from the Continental Congress, twelve
of the thirteen states enacted legislation promoting the creation of
27science and arts. The Framers suggested that the states grant creators
fourteen years of protection, with an additional fourteen-year renewable
term if the author was still living.28 This system was not effective because
one state's law had no bearing on another state.29 The Framers soon
realized that federal recognition of copyright was needed to adequately
protect the interests of all the states' citizens.30  The Framers
unanimously approved the Copyright Clause at the Constitutional
Convention on September 5, 1787.31
C. The "[L]imited Times"32 Provision of the Copyright Clause
The Framers painstakingly deliberated over the language of the
Copyright Clause." Before its official creation, several drafts were
submitted, each with variations on the period of protection granted.34 In
addition, the Copyright Clause became the only power in Article I of the
27. Waltersheid, supra note 23, at 347-49 (quoting 24 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326-27 (1928)).
28. See id. at 349 (citing 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326
(1928)). By 1786, twelve states had enacted general copyright statutes. Id. The copyright
term granted to authors and inventors was either twenty or twenty-one years, or the term
provided in the Statute of Anne. Id.
29. Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers
Include It with Unanimous Approval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 374 (1992).
30. Id. at 362.
31. Id. at 361. The text of the Copyright Clause demonstrates the importance of
limitations on congressional power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. However,
because there is no record of any debate, its ambiguity, and the Framer's intent, will likely
never truly be known. See Donner, supra note 29 at 361.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
33. Karl Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
17 GEO. L.J. 109, 113-14 (1929). In examining the numerous amount of copyright
extensions since the enactment of the Copyright Clause, it seems that Congress believes
that the "limited Times" provision was placed in the Copyright Clause without any
consideration. This is not the case. See Petitioner's Brief at 17, Eldred (No. 01-618) (citing
III DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 556 (Dep't
of State 1900) (Convention, Aug. 18, 1787)).
34. Fenning, supra note 33, at 113 (comparing Madison's draft of the Copyright
Clause: "to secure to literary authors their copyrights for a limited time," with Charles
Pinckney: "to secure to authors exclusive rights for certain time."). See also Petitioner's
Brief at 17, Eldred (No. 01-618) (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, § 557, at 402 (reprinted with introduction by R.
Rotunda & Nowak eds., 1987) ("'Certain' suggests a fixed, knowable period; 'limited'
suggests not just that the period be fixed, but that it also be short in duration.").
[Vol. 53:161
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Constitution that explicitly stated both its objectives, promoting the
progress of the arts and sciences, and the means to accomplish those
objectives, giving limited protection.35 This precision and consideration
demonstrates the importance of a fixed limit of protection to the
Framers.36
After the Framers approved the Copyright Clause in 1787, the First
Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1790."7 This Act granted authors
the exclusive right to their respective writings for a limited term of
fourteen years, with a renewal option if the author was still living at the
end of the first term.38 The first Congress only intended for authors and
inventors to receive a maximum of twenty-eight years of protection.3 9
D. Copyright Extensions: 1831 to 1998
In 1831, Congress extended protection under the original Copyright
Act by fourteen years, bringing the total to twenty-eight years of
protection, renewable for fourteen years if the author was still living.
4
0
35. Petitioner's Brief at 15, Eldred (No. 01-618).
36. Id. at 10 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 557, at 402-03) (reprinted with introduction by R. Rotunda & J. Nowak
eds., 1987).
37. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
38. Id.
39. Id. If Congress wanted individuals to receive more than twenty-eight years of
protection, then the Act of 1790 would have provided a longer term of protection rather
than limiting protection to a total of twenty-eight years.
40. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch.16, §§ 1-2, 4 Stat. 436. The 1831 Congress granted this
extension although neither the text of the Copyright Clause nor the Copyright Act of 1790
explicitly provided the authority to retrospectively extend copyright protection. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Congress has
explicit restraints on its power through the Copyright Clause. However, because Congress
implemented this extension in 1831, later congressional acts have been deemed
constitutional. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001). ("The CTEA is
but the latest in a series of congressional extensions of the copyright term, each of which
has been made applicable both prospectively and retrospectively."). The majority appears
to rely on the fact that since these past acts have not been challenged, they must be
constitutional, not exactly the sort of fact-finding the plaintiffs had in mind. Had the first
extension received objection, it is possible that no further extensions would have taken
place, and the Copyright Term Extension Act would not exist today. The court of appeals
in Eldred considered the Act of 1790 a copyright extension, even though federal
recognition of copyrights required the creation of a law. Id. at 384 (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting). The majority realized the ambiguity surrounding the Copyright Clause and
embraced the lack of clarity to its advantage. Id. The majority tried to foster enough one-
line quotes from cases over the last one-hundred and fifty years to make its case in favor
of retrospective extensions. Id. Without the existence of the extensions of 1831 and on,
the Eldred court would have had no other choice than to find the CTEA invalid. The
Supreme Court, however, affirmed, piling on another extension. See Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
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The extension provided American authors and inventors with equivalent
protection afforded to those in foreign countries.
In 1909, Congress extended copyright protection a second time,
lengthening the renewal term to twenty-eight years, thereby granting
living authors a total of fifty-six years of protection. The 1909 Congress
ensured that, as intended by the Framers, the protection granted existed
only for the life of the author.4 ' The next major copyright extension
came in 1976, when Congress extended copyright protection to the life of
the author plus an additional fifty years, thereby redefining the term
"limited Times."" The 1976 Act replaced the previous copyright system
with a formula that calculated dual terms of protection. Under the new
system, Congress extended protection to the life of the creator plus fifty
years for known authors and inventors, and seventy-five years for
anonymous works or works created for hire.46 The 1976 Act paved the
way for the CTEA of 1998.47
In 1998, Congress passed the most recent copyright extension. The
CTEA extended the term of protection by an additional twenty years for
both existing and future copyrights. 48 For any work published before
41. See Patry, supra note 21 at 917 (citing 7 Cong. Deb. App. CXIX-CXX (1830))
(remarks of Representative Ellsworth)). It is important to note that the argument made
by Congress for enacting the CTEA, the harmonization of European and U.S. law, is the
same argument used by the 1976 Congress. See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and
Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1995). See also H.R.
Rep. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998); Eldred, 239 F.3d at 384. As the dissent noted in Eldred,
"Neither the European Union nor its constituent nation states are bound by the
Constitution of the United States. That Union may have all sorts of laws about copyrights
or any other subject which are beyond the power of our constitutionally defined central
government." Id. The harmonization of copyright law among countries does not promote
the progress of arts and sciences. Id.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 23 (1909) (repealed 1978).
43. Id. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. Congress specifically made the
protection contingent on the author still being alive. Id. This demonstrates that the Act of
1976, which extended protection past the author's death, was not in accord with the intent
of the first Congress. Over the course of sixty-seven years, Congress continually increased
the protection afforded to works already created with nine separate small extensions from
1910-1975. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 2.
44. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553 §§ 302-305, 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-76 (1976)
(codified as amended as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq.). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
45. Id.
46. Id. §§ 302, 304 (1976).
47. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998). The lower courts in Eldred relied on the 1976 extension in finding the
CTEA constitutional. Had someone challenged Congress on its authority to enact the
1976 extension, Congress may have never considered the CTEA. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp.
2d at 2.
48. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title 1, 112
Stat. 2827-28 (1998).
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January 1, 1978, and still under copyright on October 27, 1998, the
CTEA extends the term of protection to ninety-five years.4 9 For works
published after 1978, the CTEA extends the term of protection for the
life of the author plus seventy years. For anonymous or corporate
authors, the term is the shorter of ninety-five years from the year of first
publication, or one-hundred and twenty years from creation. 1  In
comparing the Act of 1790 with the CTEA, the protection granted has
jumped from 14 years to the life of the author plus seventy years.52 With
this consistent stream of extensions, one would think that this practice is
constitutionally permissible.
E. The Supreme Court has Recognized that Congress' Copyright Power is
Limited and that Boundaries are Needed
Despite the number of copyright extensions, the Supreme Court
recognized in several copyright and patent infringement cases that the
"limited [t]imes"53 provision of the Copyright Clause is a restraint on
congressional power." In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court
examined judicial precedent dating back to 1851, in the context of a
patent infringement action.5 More importantly, the Court addressed the
scope of congressional power, explaining that Congress' power under the
Copyright Clause was "limited to the promotion of advances in the useful
arts." 56 The Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
49. Id. at § 102(b)(3)(A), 112 Stat. 2827.
50. Id. § 102(a)(1).
51. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Title I.
52. Compare Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, with Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act, Title I.
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
54. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349-50 (1991).
55. Graham, 383 U.S. at 4. The Court noted, "Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available." Id. at 6. Although this
case concerned patent infringement, the Court engaged in the type of analysis that it
should have used in Eldred. The Court used the text of the Copyright Clause in trying to
determine the Framers intent: "Congress ... may not overreach the restraints imposed by
the stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard
to the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby." Id. at 5-6. This
demonstrates that in using the Copyright Clause, Congress must adhere to its strict textual
parameters. For the current Congress this would mean not granting protection unless
something is received in exchange. This analysis would exclude retrospective extensions
from consideration because protection is granted to authors, but the authors do not give
anything to the public in exchange.
56. Id. at 5.
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Inc., held that a state statute was preempted by the Supremacy Clause, as
it protected creations lacking federal patent protection.57 In so finding,
the Court stated that the Copyright Clause "contains both a grant of
power and certain limitations upon the exercise of that power.",1
8
The Supreme Court also recognized that the limited protection given
to creators is secondary to the main goal of serving the public good. 9 In
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,6° the Supreme Court noted that
the limited scope of the monopoly given to creators, like the limited
copyright protection mandated by the Constitution, demonstrated a
balance of opposing claims upon public welfare.61 The Court stated that
the perfect balance would achieve the necessary motivation to encourage
creation, while serving the stated public cause of wide public accessibility
to music, literature, and the useful arts.62  In addition, in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Court found that
the "primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors,
but '[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts.'
63
Furthermore, in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,64 the Supreme Court expressed
the importance of having defined boundaries.65  Supreme Court
precedent demonstrates that necessary limits restrain Congress'
copyright power.66
57. Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 143-44. This case resembled a patent infringement
case, but the main difference was that no official patent was at issue. Id. at 144. Florida
had a statute prohibiting the use of the "direct molding process" to duplicate unpatented
boat hulls and the knowing sale of duplicated hulls. Id. at 145. The Supreme Court ruled
in favor of defendants and held that the Florida statute conflicted with federal policy
favoring the free competition in ideas not meriting patent protection. Id. at 166-67.
58. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
59. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994); Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50
(emphasis added).
60. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975). This case involved
a copyright infringement action against the owner and operator of a restaurant. Id. at 152.
In ruling in favor of the restaurant owner, the Court held that the radio reception of
broadcasted copyrighted musical compositions did not constitute a "performance" of the
songs. Id. at 162. The Court further held that the restaurant owner who played the songs
over the speakers in his restaurant did not infringe on the copyright holders' exclusive
right under the Copyright Act. Id. at 159, 162-63.
61. Id. at 156.
62. Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156; see also Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526.
63. Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50 (emphasis added).
64. 510 U.S. 517 (1994). In Fogerty the holder of a copyrighted song brought an
infringement action against the original musician who composed the song. Id. at 519-20.
65. Id. at 527 ("Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the
general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the
boundaries of copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible.").
66. See supra notes 53-65; see also infra note 68. This history contrasts with what the
lower courts and the Supreme Court found in Eldred. Inconsistencies will continue until
actual numerical limits are put into effect giving Congress some guidance.
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F. Eldred v. Reno: Summary of the Controversy
The petitioners in Eldred7 asserted that limits previously recognized
by the Supreme Court prove that the CTEA is unconstitutional.
68
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the CTEA because works
published in or after 1923, that would have entered the public domain in
1998, would remain in the possession of the current copyright holders for
an additional twenty years under the Act.69 This is dramatically different
from the initial copyright term of fourteen years, renewable only once by
living authors.7 0
Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the CTEA on three
grounds: (1) CTEA's violation of the First Amendment of the
Constitution; (2) violation of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution by
retroactive extensions; and (3) violation of the public trust doctrine.7
The district court summarily dismissed petitioners' arguments. This
Comment will focus solely on petitioners' retrospective extension
argument; specifically, the claim that the CTEA violates the "limited
Times" provision of the Copyright Clause. 3 In dismissing petitioners'
retrospective extensions argument, the Court relied heavily on Congress'
unchallenged, consistent practice of extending copyright protection.
67. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). Petitioners in Eldred were
several individuals and corporations who "use, copy, reprint, perform, enhance, restore or
sell works of art, film, or literature in the public domain." Id. at 2. To encourage the free
use of literature, Eric Eldred had planned to post on his website many works due to come
off protection in the next few years. See Brief for Petioner at 5, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534
U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618).
68. Petitioner's Brief at 12, Eldred (No. 01-618) (arguing that the lower courts' failure
to apply the limits of the Copyright Clause was in error given the Supreme Court's long
historical recognition of limitations in the Copyright Clause). See generally Wheaton v.
Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989); Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Ser. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
69. See generally Petioner's Brief at 3, Eldred (No. 01-618).
70. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. See also Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title 1, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998). CTEA extends
protection for an additional twenty years, preventing plaintiffs from using many works. Id.
71. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999).
72. Id. at 3-4. The court noted that there are no First Amendment rights to use the
copyrighted works of others. Id. at 3 (citing United Video v. F.C.C., 890 F.2d 1173, 1191
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556
(1985)). In dismissing the plaintiffs' public trust doctrine argument, the court explained
that the doctrine was not applicable to copyrights, and thus the CTEA did not violate the
doctrine. Id. at 3-4.
73. Id. at 3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. A discussion of the First Amendment and
public trust doctrine arguments are omitted because this Comment is primarily concerned
with the Copyright Clause and the CTEA's retrospective application.
74. Eldred, 74 F.Supp. 2d at 2-3. Plaintiffs, in their retrospective extension argument,
claimed that the CETA violated the "to [a]uthors" term of the Copyright Clause. Id. at 3.
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The court fostered the principle that an unsupported foundation will
eventually, through many unsupported acts, become strong and well-. • 75
supported because no one will ever challenge or check its construction.
1. The District Court Relied on Four Cases in Finding the CTEA
Constitutional
In response to petitioners' argument that the CTEA's retrospective
extension exceeded Congress' Copyright Clause authority, the district
court relied on four cases in finding the CTEA constitutional.76  The
district court, in relying on only these cases, overlooked Supreme Court
precedent that recognized limitations on the use of the copyright power."
First, the district court cited Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc.78 to support its finding that "Congress defines the scope of
the grant of copyrights to authors or to inventors under its Copyright
Clause power., 79 Second, the district court cited Pennock & Sellers v.S 80
Dialogue, in which the Supreme Court noted "that this exclusive right
shall exist but for a limited period, and that period shall be subject to the
discretion of Congress. 81  Third, the Court relied on McClurg v.
See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8. cl. 8. In dismissing the argument, the court reasoned that the
CTEA merely gives effect to agreements that were already in existence and therefore, a
retrospective extension does not violate this provision. Id.
75. Eldred, 74 F.Supp.2d at 3.
76. Id. It may seem as though this Comment is simplifying the district court's ruling,
but it is not. The district court's opinion was little more than three pages. Id. at 1-4. In
addition, the ruling on the plaintiffs' "limited Times" argument consisted of one paragraph
citing to four cases. Id.
77. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834) (rejecting common law copyright);
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding trademark law unsupported by Copyright
Clause power); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (stating that the Copyright
Clause is "both a grant of power and a limitation"); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (rejecting state law which added patent type protection);
Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (finding "originality" to be a
constitutional requirement). See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The
lower courts failed to recognize that the challenge to the CTEA was one of first
impression. Id. Rather than devise their own conclusion as to why the CTEA is
constitutional, the lower courts sought support in unrelated infringement cases. Eldred, 74
F.Supp. 2d at 3. By extracting one sentence from each of the four cases, the lower courts
demonstrated that it is possible to find support for any argument in any case mentioning
the same topic, even though the case may apply in an unrelated context.
78. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
79. Eldred, 74 F.Supp. 2d at 3 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 429).
80. Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
81. Id. at 16-17. However, the district court shortened the language used by the court
to: "limited Times provision is subject to the discretion of Congress." See Eldred, 74 F.
Supp.2d at 3.
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Kingsland82 to find that "Congress has authority to enact retrospective
laws under the Copyright Clause. 8 3 Finally, in sounding the death knell,
the district court examined Schnapper v. Foley84 and found that "the
introductory language of the Copyright Clause does not limit this
power."85
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,8 copyright
owners of television programs brought a copyright infringement action
against Sony, a manufacturer and seller of home videotape recorders
(VTR).87  The copyright owners alleged that users of Sony's VTR were
infringing on their copyrights by recording their works displayed on
television, and that Sony was liable for such infringement because it
marketed the VTRs.8 In holding that videotape recording was capable
of non-infringing use, the Supreme Court found that Sony adequately
demonstrated that a substantial number of copyright holders were
unlikely to object to having their broadcasts recorded by private
viewers. 89  More importantly, the Court acknowledged that the
Constitution assigned to Congress "the task of defining the scope of the
limited monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in
82. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843). Although the Eldred Court
interpreted McClurg as giving Congress unlimited power under the Copyright Clause to
enact retrospective extensions, that is not explicitly what the Court held. Id. at 206. In
McClurg, a case regarding patent infringement, the Court ruled that Congress can enact
laws that are retrospective in their operation; but the Court never mentioned the
Copyright Clause or extensions, and therefore, it should be interpreted narrowly and
should only apply in the narrow context of patent infringement. Id.
83. Eldred, 74 F.Supp. 2d at 3 (citing McClurg, 42 U.S. at 206).
84. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d. 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
85. Eldred, 74 F.Supp. 2d at 3 n.6 (citing Schnapper, 667 F.2d at 112).
86. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
87. Id. at 419-20. Sony had nothing to do with challenges to Congress' authority. Id.
at 420. In addition, Sony had no relation to retrospective challenges. Id. Sony was a
simple copyright infringement case, thus having no real connection to the present
controversy. The Eldred district court, in searching for support, merely extracted one
sentence from the Sony opinion and deemed Congress' otherwise unscrupulous act,
constitutional. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3. When the Supreme Court heard the
Eldred case, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor questioned the CTEA's
legitimacy. See Gina Holland, High Court Debates Copyright Extension, (Oct. 10, 2002)
available at http://www.s-t.com/daily/10-02/10-10-02/a16buO65.htm. ("I can find a lot of
fault with what Congress did. This flies directly in the face of what the framers of the
Constitution had in mind, but is it unconstitutional?"). Justice O'Connors' skepticism says
it all, yet nothing was done to limit Congress' power. Id.
88. Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
89. Id. at 456 (finding that videotape recording was capable of non-infringing uses,
manufacturers' sale of equipment did not constitute contributory infringement of
copyright holders' rights, and that copyright owners failed to show how the recordings
would cause anything more than minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of,
their copyrighted works).
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order to give the public appropriate access to their work product." 9 This
acknowledgement affirms the fact that the Copyright Clause appears in
Article One and is a power vested in Congress, rather than in the
executive or judicial branches.1
92In Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, a patent infringement suit, the
plaintiffs claimed that the defendants infringed on their patent, which
improved the process of creating tubes or hoses for conveying air, water,
and other liquid matters.93 The Supreme Court held that if an inventor
makes his discovery public, as the plaintiff did, and allows others to use it
without objection, and before applying for a patent, he abandons the
privilege to claim the exclusive right that a patent would have entitled
him.94 The Supreme Court acknowledged that the copyright power is
explicitly granted to Congress in the Copyright Clause and therefore is
subject to Congress' discretion within the defined limits.95 The Eldred
Court relied on this statement as additional support for its finding.96
In McClurg v. Kingsland,97 patent owners brought an infringement
action against defendant."' The Supreme Court, relying partly onPennock, ruled in favor of the defendants because they had an existing
90. Id. at 429.
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3. The district
court relied on this statement as evidence that Congress possessed near unbounded
authority in its use of the Copyright Clause.
92. Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 23-24. Specifically, plaintiff failed to comply with the Patent Act. See id. at
13. Plaintiff's patent did not bar defendant from freely using it because plaintiff permitted
defendant to utilize the invention before obtaining the patent. Id. at 23-24.
95. Id. at 16-17.
96. Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3. See Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 19 (noting that if a
patent holder were permitted to allow the public to use his work for some time, but then at
some point, was able to arbitrarily exclude the public from its use, "it would materially
retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should
be least prompt to communicate their discoveries"). See also Brief for Petioner at 16,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618) (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 1.27-28 (1932)). The language of exchange used by the Supreme Court
demonstrates that a monopoly granted through limited protection is "the equivalent given
by the public for benefits bestowed." ld. at 16 n.5. It is a means of paying the author for
what would not have otherwise been created. Id. This demonstrates that protection is not
something that is intended to be granted for free. Id. Protection was merely to be granted
if something was produced. Id. A retrospective extension does not comply with the
exchange requirements of the Copyright Clause. Id. Congress may assume that any
exchange will suffice, however, the exchange contemplated by the first Congress was
protection for creation, not protection for political contributions. Id. See also Act of May
31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. As such, the Court indicated the need for society to limit the
term of protection granted to authors and inventors. See Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19.
97. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843).
98. Id. at 204.
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use of the patent before it was assigned to the patent owners. 99 The
Supreme Court stated that in the realm of patents, retrospective laws are
permitted.'06 The Eldred Court interpreted this statement as authorizing
Congress to enact retrospective extensions under the Copyright Clause."10
In Schnapper v. Foley, appellants challenged the arrangements
between government agencies and public broadcasters for the filming
and dissemination of a television show.' 3 The appellants argued that an
individual or organization commissioned by the government to create a
literary or artistic work could not obtain a copyright in that creation.104
In granting respondents' motion to dismiss, the D.C. Circuit found that
copyright laws permitted the registration of works commissioned by the
government and the subsequent assignment of copyrights to the
government. Applying the rule from Mitchell Brothers Film Group v.
Cinema Adult Theatre,'°6 the court noted that "Congress need not
'require that each copyrighted work be shown to promote the useful
arts."" 7 The Schnapper court then expanded the Mitchell rule to find
that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause does not
constitute a limit on congressional power.' 8  Rather than interpret
Schnapper narrowly to apply solely to government sponsored
99. Id. at 210.
100. Id. at 206.
101. Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
102. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
103. Id. at 105. The television show at issue was "Equal Justice Under Law." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 105, 108-09.
106. Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979).
Mitchell arguably does not relate to the case at issue as it did not involve a challenge to the
constitutionality of a congressional act, but rather was a suit between private parties. Id.
at 854. Owners of a registered copyrighted movie brought an infringement suit against
two theatres and several individuals, claiming copyright infringement as a result of the
copyrighted movie being shown at the theatres. Id. The alleged infringers' asserted an
affirmative defense that because the movie was obscene, the owners of the copyright were
barred from relief under the equitable notion of "unclean hands." Id. at 854. The Court,
without reaching the decision of whether the film was obscene, held that: (1) the copyright
statute contained no explicit or implicit bar to copyrighting obscene materials and
provided for a copyright of all creative pieces, regardless of obscenity, that would
otherwise meet the requirements of the Copyright Act of 1909; (2) protection of any and
all creation regardless of content was constitutionally permissible means of promoting
science and the useful arts under Congress' copyright power; (3) obscenity was not an
appropriate defense in an infringement action. Id. at 854-55, 863.
107. Schnapper, 667 F.2d at 112 (quoting Mitchell, 604 F.2d at 860).
108. Id. If the Schnapper court intended for this rule to apply outside the narrow area
of government commissioned works, then it would clearly be in violation of the Copyright
Clause, which explicitly limits congressional power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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copyrights, 0 9 the Eldred Court applied Schnapper, along with Sony,
Pennock, and McClurg, to find CTEA's retrospective extension within
Congress' discretion. "
2. The Court of Appeals Affirmed the District Court's Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
the lower court's ruling in Eldred v. Reno."' The majority premised its
holding on the theory that the first Copyright Act of 1790 was in fact an
extension of existing state copyright law."2 In addition, the court noted
that the 1998 extension was only the most recent of many congressional
extensions of the copyright term."3 The majority acknowledged that "[i]f
the Congress were to make copyright protection permanent, then it
surely would exceed the power conferred upon it by the Copyright
Clause.",1
4
The majority stated that the court was subject to the rule of avoidance
and therefore could not consider the argument raised solely by the
amicus-that the CTEA violates the preamble to the Copyright Clause."'
In dicta, the court added that it would find the CTEA "necessary and
proper" because the Act provides for United States copyrights to have
the same terms of protection as European Union copyrights.' 6 The court
concluded by acknowledging that Congress has difficult decisions to
make in interpreting the Copyright Clause, and the court extends beyond
its proper role if it alters the "delicate" balance Congress has sought to
achieve.
17
109. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J. dissenting)
(urging the majority in Eldred to interpret Schnapper to apply narrowly to government
sponsored works), affd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
110. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999), affd 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir.
2001), and affid sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). It is important to note
that the district court's discussion of these cases is contained entirely within one
paragraph. Id. Each case was cited for one specific sentence, and no further mention was
made to any of the four cases, or to the context within which the specific statements were
made. See id.
111. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380. In affirming the lower court's holding, the court of
appeals thus supported its reliance on Sony, Pennock, McClurg, and Schnapper to find in
favor of the government. Id.
112. Id. at 374.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 377.
115. Id. at 377-78. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(finding it "particularly inappropriate to reach the merits of the amicus's position" because
the plaintiffs only claimed that the Copyright Clause as a whole constitutes a substantive
limit on Congress' power, and the court must avoid constitutional questions not at issue).
116. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 379.
117. Id. at 380.
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3. Judge Sentelle's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Sentelle disputed the majority's arguments using
substantive case precedent. "8 Sentelle began his analysis with United
States v. Lopez, " 9 in which the Supreme Court invalidated the Gun-Free
School Zones Act. 20 In Lopez, the Supreme Court held that the Act
exceeded the "outer limits" of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause."' Sentelle argued that this "outer limits" theory applies to the
Copyright Clause in addition to all the other enumerated powers.1
2 2
Judge Sentelle noted that there are limits to congressional power
inherent in the Copyright Clause.2 3 Sentelle stated, "[t]his clause is not
an open grant of power to secure exclusive rights. It is a grant of a power
to promote progress., 124 The Supreme Court noted in Lopez, and again
in United States v. Morrison, that simply because Congress concluded a
given piece of legislation serves a constitutional purpose "does not




The dissent next examined the majority's reliance on Schnapper v.
Foley as a bar to finding the CTEA unconstitutional. Judge Sentelle
acknowledged that Schnapper found that each grant of copyright
protection need not promote the useful arts.12 However, Sentelle argued
that Schnapper should be read narrowly to apply only to commissioned
copyrights by the United States government. Outside that context,
Schnapper does not trump the Copyright Clause of the Constitution,
118. Id. at 380-84 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
119. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
120. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57.
121. See id. at 551, 556-57.
122. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 381 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("[i]f we were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate." (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564)).
123. Id. at 381-82 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (expounding on this argument, Sentelle stated that
the Copyright Clause "empowers the Congress to do one thing, and one thing only. "That
one thing is 'to promote the progress of science and useful arts.' How may Congress do
that? 'By securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.').
125. Id. at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 n.2; United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000)).
126. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 382-83 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667
F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
127. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
128. Id. This is simply another example of the lower courts reaching for support. See
Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999). If Schnapper is to have any bearing at
all, it should only be in the narrow context of government-sponsored copyrights. See
Eldred, 239 F.3d. at 382-83 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Outside that area, especially in the
Eldred case, one involving a significant constitutional challenge, the Schnapper case
should not apply. Id.
2003]
Catholic University Law Review
which places a limit on congressional authority."' Sentelle pointed out
that the court should require that the use of the copyright power at least
harmonize with the language of the clause granting Congress the power
to enact the statute in the first place, which the CTEA did not.
130
The dissent disputed the majority's finding that the first Copyright Act
of 1790 was a retrospective extension. Sentelle stated, "[n]ecessarily,
something had to be done to begin the operation of federal law under the
new federal Constitution. 132 [The Copyright Act of 1790] created the first
. . . federal copyright protection; it did not extend subsisting federal
copyrights enacted pursuant to the Constitution.
' 13
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority's claim that the court was
barred from considering whether the CTEA violated the preamble to the
Copyright Clause because appellants did not raise the issue.' 34 Sentelle
argued that the appellants had raised the issue and, as required, the
amicus merely elaborated on it as desired and expected.13 ' Furthermore,
Sentelle argued that the court was not limited to the parties' particular
legal theories, and therefore had the power to exercise independent
judgment. 136
4. Petitioners' Brief Correctly Asserted that the CTEA Exceeds
Congress' Power
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling, the petitioners in Eldred correctly
asserted that the CTEA's retrospective extension exceeded Congress'
power pursuant to the Copyright Clause because it violated the "limited
129. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 382-83 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The presence of the "limited
Times" provision supports this statement. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
130. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 383 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (commenting on the CTEA,
Judge Sentelle stated, "This the extension does not do. It is not within the enumerated
power."). Id.
131. Id. at 384 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). See also Petitioner's Brief at 28, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618). The Supreme Court has recognized that the Act of
1790 created a new right, therefore it did not give effect to an existing copyright, as the
majority in Eldred claimed. Id. (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214-15 (1954); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834)).
134. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 383-84 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 384 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Specifically, Sentelle noted "'[w]hen an issue
or claim is properly before the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal
theories advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and
apply the proper construction of governing law."' Id. (citing United States Nat'l Bank of
Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,446 (1993) (quoting Kamen v. Kemper
Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99, (1991)).
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Times" provision. 37 In making this argument, petitioners' relied on three
primary deficiencies of the CTEA.38
First, terms that can be continually lengthened through an infinite
number of extensions are not limited in duration. 39  If a literary
masterpiece never enters the public domain, either because it was
granted permanent protection or through an infinite number of limited
extensions, the fact still remains that the main goal of the Copyright
Clause is thwarted; the public cannot freely use the work.40 Regardless
of how one interprets "limited Times," the protection serves merely as a
means to this end.
1 41
Second, extending the protection of existing works does not, as the
Framers contemplated, "promote the progress of science and useful
arts. 1 42 Overall, creations that had previously received protection cannot
further promote progress by receiving more protection because nothing
new is being produced. 43  Instead, retrospective extensions retardprogress because they deprive the public of the derivative use of existing
137. See Brief for Petioners at 10, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-
618).
138. Id.
139. Id. In the artificial sense, as adopted by the majority in Eldred, arguably each
extension is limited, because it did not involve a grant of permanent protection. Eldred,
239 F.3d at 377-78. However, it is unlikely that the Framers would see any value in this
type of artificial distinction. Finding loopholes is not the task of Congress or the courts.
140. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991); see
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994). The Supreme Court has propounded, in
varying language, the main purpose of the Copyright Clause in several cases: "serving,"
"enriching" and "encouraging" are all key terms used in the Supreme Court's overall
definition "to serve the public cause by promoting wide public accessibility to music,
literature and the useful arts." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975).
141. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). If the Framers intended
progress to be the main goal, why would they seek permanent protection accomplished in
any guise? Logic dictates that limited times means a fixed and unchangeable period of
time.
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Petioner's Brief at 7, Eldred (No. 01-618) (citing
Edward Rappaport, Copyright Term Extension: Estimating the Economic Values,
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 8, 12, 15, 16 (May 11, 1998)). Some
copyright holders may be encouraged to refurbish an old movie, but this is likely only a
small minority compared to the number of works that would be created if all the works
scheduled to be released entered the public domain.
143. See Petioner's Brief at 22, Eldred (No. 01-618). ("Retroactive extensions cannot
'promote' the past. No matter what we offer Hawthorne or Hemingway or Gershwin, they
will not produce anything more."). Illustrative of this problem are the many other authors
waiting for these protected works to enter the public domain so they can use them. See id.
at 3-4.
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works. '4" The purpose behind the Copyright Clause-the promotion of
progress-is simply not accomplished through the use of these
extensions.14 The Walt Disney Company exemplified this problem when
it decided that purchasing the copyright of an existing successful
character was a wiser financial investment than devoting time and energy
toward creating a new character.1
4
1
Finally, retrospective extensions violate the quid pro quo requirement
of the Copyright Clause because protection is granted, but nothing is
received in exchange. 147 This scenario results in a unilateral exchange,/ e. • • 148
with the copyright holders being the sole beneficiaries. This violates
the Supreme Court's understanding of the Copyright Clause as a vehicle
used to "promote the progress of science and useful arts.,
149
144. See id. at 3 (demonstrating how the petitioners in the case planned on using many
of the works that were due to enter the public domain, however, because of the CTEA,
they were prohibited).
145. Id. at 2. Dover, a plaintiff to this case, planned on republishing several works
once they entered the public domain. Id. at 3. In addition, many other organizations had
already prepared to use these works, but now, because of the CTEA, their labor will be of
no use for at least another twenty years. Id. at 3-5. Consequently, these individuals will be
deterred from using prospective public domain works in the future because of the
uncertainty that the work will ever fall into the public domain. Id. at 6-7.
146. See Knudsen, supra note 16, at 22 (noting that Disney's purchase of the Winnie
the Pooh copyright was contingent upon Congress passing the CTEA). See also Disney
Buys the Rights to Winnie the Pooh, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2001, at C12; Petioner's Brief at
7, Eldred (No. 01-618) (arguing that the few copyright holders that benefit from the CTEA
will earn billions of dollars from its retrospective protection). Had characters like Winnie
the Pooh entered the public domain, it is likely that many different derivative uses of these
characters would have occurred, but because of the CTEA, these new uses will be delayed.
In addition, it is likely that when a corporation purchases an existing copyrighted
character, it does so instead of investing resources into creating a new character. The
public, however, would be better off had the corporation created a new character because
then two characters would have been developed rather than just one. As can be gleaned
from this example, overall, retrospective extensions do very little, but discourage
creativity, and further prevent works from entering the public domain. See Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(extending protection of pre-existing copyrights, thereby delaying their availability to the
public).
147. See Petioner's Brief at 10, Eldred (No. 01-618),. Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue,
27 U.S. (2 Pt.) 1, 23 (1829). Under the CTEA, Congress gives current copyright holders an
additional twenty years of protection, but the copyright holders do not give anything back
to the public. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title
I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
148. The CTEA materially retards the progress of science and useful arts by ignoring
the bargained-for exchange implicit within the Copyright Clause. See Pennock, 27 U.S. at
19, 23.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50
(1991); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994).
[Vol. 53:161
Promoting Progress Through Perpetual Protection
5. The Supreme Court Affirmed the Lower Courts
A Supreme Court majority, in a seven-two decision, affirmed the lower
courts and thus conclusively dismissed Eldred's claims."" The majority
began its analysis of the petitioners' claims "against the backdrop of
Congress' previous exercises of its authority under the Copyright
Clause."' 5 ' In agreeing with the lower courts, the majority premised that
because the first federal Copyright Act in 1790 extended protection to
existing state granted copyrights, then retrospective extensions were a
constitutional practice."' The majority further posited that the CTEA
was in accord with the "unbroken congressional practice" of granting
existing works protection.5  In reliance on this argument, the majority
cited a law review article which stated, "the author of yesterday's work
should not get a lesser reward than the author of tomorrow's work just
because Congress passed a statute lengthening the term today.'
5 4
After concluding that the CTEA complied with the "limited Times"
provision, the majority then determined that the Act was a rational
exercise of Congress' authority.' The majority put forth three reasons
for this determination.' First, by extending protection an additional
twenty years, "Congress sought to ensure that American authors would
receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their European
counterparts." 117 Second, "the CTEA may also provide greater incentive
for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in
150. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003).
151. Id. at 194.
152. See id. The majority acknowledged the parties' dispute over whether the Act of
1790 was in fact a retrospective extension, or whether it was the only way for the Framers
to acknowledge state backed copyrights while at the same time creating a controlling
federal scheme. Id. at 194 n.3. History demonstrates that the state copyright systems were
having trouble, so the Framers created a system that would provide uniformity throughout
the states, and thus had to extend the protection to works existing works in order for the
system to immediately replace state laws. See Donner supra note 29. Nevertheless, the
majority concluded that the Framer's act demonstrates that retrospective extensions were
permissible. Id. at 194.
153. Id. at 200.
154. Id. at 204 (quoting Symposium, The Constitutionality of Copyright Term
Extension, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 694 (2000) (Prof. Miller)).
155. Id. at 204-205. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
156. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205-07.
157. Id. at 205-06. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998). See also Eldred, 239 F.3d at
373-74. Other rationales for extending protection put forth were: providing an incentive
for holders of existing copyrights to restore older works and pass them to the public; giving
authors additional compensation so they can pass it on to their ancestors; and providing an
additional incentive for authors to create new works. See S. Rep. No. 104-315, at 3 (1998).
See also H.R. Rep. No. 105-452, at 4 (1998). Congress clearly believes that as long as the
CTEA has some effect it is in accord with the Framer's intent. See S. Rep. No. 104-315, at
3 (1998).
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the United States."'58 Third, "longer terms would encourage copyright
holders to invest in the restoration and public distribution of their
works." 5 9
The Court then disposed of petitioners' claims that the CTEA fails to
promote progress as imagined by the Framers, and that it ignores the
implicit quid pro quo of the Copyright Clause. The majority
acknowledged Supreme Court precedent that labeled the Copyright
Clause as "'both a grant of power and a limitation,"' and acknowledged
that "'the primary objective of copyright' is to 'promote the progress of
science. '"" However, the majority, like the lower courts, fell back on the
concept that "'[i]t is not our role to alter the delicate balance Congress
has labored to achieve."",16' The majority then dismissed petitioners'
bargained-for exchange argument on the grounds that when an author or
inventor copyrights his work, he contemplates that the copyright offered
him, "a copyright not only for the time in place when protection is
gained, but also for any renewal or extension legislated during that
time.' ' 162 In conclusion, the majority asserted, "we are not at liberty to
second-guess congressional determinations and policy judgments of this
order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be. ,
63
6. Justice Stevens' Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Stevens, expressed his thoughts on the Copyright
Clause:
Neither the purpose of encouraging new inventions nor the
overriding interest in advancing progress by adding knowledge
to the public domain is served by retrospectively increasing the
inventor's compensation for a completed invention and
frustrating the legitimate expectations of members of the public
who want to make use of it in a free market. Because those
twin purposes provide the only avenue for congressional action
under the Copyright/Patent Clause of the Constitution, any
other action is manifestly unconstitutional.'6
158. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 206 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 207.
160. Id. at 212 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5
(1966); Fiest Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 449 U.S. 340, 349 (1991)).
161. Id. at 784-85 (quoting also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
162. Id. at 215.
163. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In assuming a contractarian approach, Stevens stated that "[i]t would be
manifestly unfair if, after issuing a patent, the Government as a
representative of the public sought to modify the bargain by shortening
the term of the patent in order to accelerate public access to the
invention. 1 65  Stevens further asserted that considerations of fairness
implicit within constitutional protections prohibiting ex post facto laws
and laws impairing obligations of contracts bar Congress from interfering
with a bargained-for exchange without providing compensation for the
taking. 166 Justice Stevens relied strongly on Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co. for the premise that a state cannot "'extend the life of a patent
beyond its expiration date,"' and thus neither can Congress.
167
Justice Stevens found none of the government's arguments• 168
persuasive. First, he rejected the government's argument that the first• 169
Copyright Act of 1790 was a retrospective extension. Justice Stevens
stated that the first Copyright Act did not extend pre-existing copyrights,
but created a new federal right that supplanted the diverse and
inconsistent state rights that previously existed.7 ° Justice Stevens then
165. Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that these fundamental considerations should
protect members of the public who have anticipated receiving these creations to build
upon as they see fit, but will not be able to because of the "retroactive modification of the
bargain that extends the term of the patent monopoly").
167. Id. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964)). Stevens countered the majority's contention that the Sears case
applied primarily to the preemptive effect of congressional statutes. Id. at 226 n.3. He
argued that Sears, along with Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966),
and Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), "also relied on
the pre-emptive effect of the constitutional provision." Id. Stevens concluded by pointing
out that the Framers recognized that the Constitution itself imposed a limit on Congress'
use of the Copyright Clause. See id. at 230 n.6 (discussing 13 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON
128 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland, eds., 1981) (reprinting letter to Tench Coxe (Mar. 28, 1790)
("Congress seems to be tied down to the single mode of encouraging inventions by
granting the exclusive benefit of them for a limited time, and therefore to have no more
power to give a further encouragement out of a fund of land than a fund of money. This
fetter on the National Legislature tho' an unfortunate one, was a deliberate one."). This
statement by Madison clearly acknowledges dual limitations in Congress' use of the
copyright power: Congress is limited in the length of protection it may grant, and is also
limited to granting protection for the sole purpose of encouraging invention. See Eldred,
537 U.S. at 229-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 228 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 231-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating "[tihat Congress exercised its unquestionable
constitutional authority to create a new federal system securing rights for authors and
inventors in 1790 does not provide support for the proposition that Congress can extend
pre-existing federal protections retroactively"). In addition, Stevens points out that "even
this first act required a quid pro quo in order to receive federal copyright protection." Id.
at 231 n.7. The author was first required to register the work in a federal district court,
which would act to place the design of the invention on record, so that once the limited
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addressed the government's reliance on previous extensions."'
Emphatically, Stevens stated that Congress' use of retroactive extensions
does not result in the constitutionality of the CTEA.'72 Justice Stevens
argued that the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha demonstrates
that simply because "Congress has repeatedly acted on a mistaken
interpretation of the Constitution does not qualify [the Court's duty] to
invalidate an unconstitutional practice when it is finally challenged in an
appropriate case." '173 Stevens stated that "[r]egardless of the effect of
unconstitutional enactments of Congress, the scope of 'the constitutional
power of Congress ... is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative
question, and can be settled finally only by this Court."'174  Stevens
propounded his argument by adding, "'no one acquires a vested or
protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when
the span of time covers our entire national existence."'175
In response to the Government's third argument, that the CTEA
provides incentives to restore old movies, Justice Stevens highlighted
three reasons why the interest in preserving perishable copies of ancient
copyrighted works did not justify a blanket extension of existing
copyrights. 6 First, the restoration or preservation of old works does not
promote any new works, and any original expression occurring in the
restoration process would receive new copyright protection.177 Second,
the justification for restoring these works applies equally to works that
have already entered the public domain, and "no one seriously contends
that the Copyright/Patent Clause would authorize the grant of monopoly
privileges for works already in the public domain solely to encourage
their restoration., 178  Finally, Justice Stevens contended that even if
concern for aging movies allowed congressional protection, "the remedy
term expired the public would be able to exploit the creation. See id. "This registration
requirement in federal district court--a requirement obviously not required under the
various state laws protecting written works" evidences that the government received
something for the protection granted, unlike under the CTEA. See id.
171. Id. at 233-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The government claimed to find support in
later congressional extensions. Id.
172. Id. at 239 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In LN.S. v. Chadha, the Supreme Court
invalidated legislation despite Justice White's strong dissent whereby he claimed that the
majority's decision "sounded the 'death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions."'
Id. (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
174. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 235-36 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000)).
175. Id. at 236 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New
York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)).
176. Id. at 239 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 239-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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offered-a blanket extension of all copyrights-simply bears no
relationship to the alleged harm."'7 9
As its final argument, the government posited that when Congress
provides a longer term to encourage new authors to create, as a matter of
equity, it should also provide the same reward to all owners of unexpired
copyrights. In response, Justice Stevens stated that "[e]x post facto
extensions of existing copyrights, unsupported by any consideration of
the public interest, frustrate the central purpose of the [Copyright]
Clause.' 8 1  Justice Stevens concluded his dissent by attacking the
majority's claim that actions under the Copyright/Patent Clause are
judicially unreviewable by quoting Chief Justice John Marshall: "[I]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.,,182
7. Justice Breyer's Dissent
Agreeing with Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer noted serious defects in
the CTEA."3 As the longest blanket extension for copyrights in the
history of the nation, Breyer argued that the economic effect of the
CTEA is to make the copyright term "virtually perpetual." '14  Its
practical effect "is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of
,[s]cience." 8 5
Whereas Justice Stevens' dissent focused more on congressional
authority to extend the duration of existing copyrights, Breyer asserted
that the CTEA failed rational basis scrutiny because the CTEA involves
regulation of expression rather than economic regulation. Breyer
asserted that the statute lacks rational support because: "(1) . .. the
significant benefits that [the CTEA] bestows are private, not public; (2).
[the CTEA] threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values
179. Id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, armed with the bargained-for
exchange concept, contended that to support the government's argument would require
indulging "two untenable assumptions." Id. First, "that the public interest in free access
to copyrighted works is entirely worthless," and second, that as a class, authors and
inventors should receive a windfall based solely on a completed activity. Id.
182. Id. at 242 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177
(1803)).
183. Id. at 242-43 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Framers' use of the word "Science"
equally meant "learning or knowledge"). Id.
186. Id. at 244. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer stated that although leniency is
extended to economic regulation, this regulation restricts expression, and the United
States is a nation "constitutionally dedicated to the free dissemination of speech,
information, learning, and culture." Id.
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that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) . . . it cannot find
justification in any significant Copyright Clause related objective.'
' 7
Therefore, Breyer stated that "Congress' [sic] 'choice is clearly
wrong.""
In Breyer's first argument, he demonstrated that the CTEA will
negatively affect the public by preventing it from using many works, and
by causing it to pay several billion dollars in extra royalties to copyrighth . 189
holders. Breyer argued that the CTEA was not benefiting the public as
required, but simply acting to "impede the harvest of knowledge.' 1 90
In Breyer's second argument he asserted that the justifications for the
CTEA were not in accord with the text of the Copyright Clause. 9' First,
the traditional economic rational for copyright protection did not apply
to the CTEA because "[t]he extension will not act as an economic spur
by encouraging authors to create new works." ' 9  Second, Breyer
condemned the majority's reliance on the harmonization rationale put
forth by Congress, asserting that the CTEA did not create a uniform
American-European term in two out of three regards. 93 Third, Breyer
disputed the claim that the CTEA provided incentives to publishers and
filmmakers to republish and redistribute older copyrighted works.
194
Justice Breyer noted the inconsistency of this rationale with the
Copyright Clause because the Clause assumed an initial grant of
monopoly, designed to motivate authors to create, followed by the
termination of that monopoly in order to promote the dissemination of
187. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)).
189. Id. at 248-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 246 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Harper & Row, Publ's, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985)). Increasing the term of copyright protection does not
benefit the majority of the public as evidenced by United Airlines charging its customers
higher airfares as a result of the payments it must pay to play George Gershwin's 1924
classic Rhapsody in Blue on its flights. Id. at 248. Had this song entered the public
domain, airfare on United Airlines would be lower. See id.
191. Id. at 254 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
192. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer stated, "No potential author can reasonably
believe that he has more than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive
commercially long enough for the copyright extension to matter." Id. Justice Breyer
furthered his argument by illustrating the fact that "after 55 to 75 years, only 0.2% of all
copyrights retain commercial value," so the percentage after seventy-five years must be
even smaller. Id. From a rational economic perspective, the "present extension will
produce a copyright period of protection that, even under conservative assumptions, is
worth more than 99.8% of protection in perpetuity." Id. at 55-56. Breyer contended that
this result is in conflict with the Constitution's requirement of "limited" protection. Id. at
236.
193. Id. at 257 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 260 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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the previously created works.'95 The Copyright Clause assumes that "it is
the disappearance of the monopoly grant, not its perpetuation, that will,
on balance, promote the dissemination of works already in existence.
19 6
Furthermore, Justice Breyer asserted that the problem with Congress'
view, as demonstrated above, was that there would never be a stopping
point.
197
Justice Breyer dismissed Congress' rationale that the CTEA
"'ensure[s] adequate copyright protection for American works in foreign
nations"' and has "'economic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of
trade.""98 Breyer acknowledged that Congress had enacted legislation to
suppress competition abroad, however, he asserted that such legislation
was enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 199
Finally, Justice Breyer condemned the majority's reliance on possible
demographic, technological and economic changes which would justify
the CTEA.2°° Breyer stated that demographic changes seemed to argue
against the CTEA.' Furthermore, economic changes were remedied by
the 1976 Copyright Act, which extended copyright terms beyond the life
of the author, thus guaranteeing that longer life spans were accounted for
in copyright grants. Finally, in response to the majority's argument
that adults are having children later in life based on technological
changes as a justification for the CTEA, Breyer asserted that that fact did
not justify providing protection seventy years past the author's death.20 3
Breyer stated that "[t]here is no legitimate, serious copyright-related




195. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original)
197. See id. at 261 (Breyer, J., dissenting). "The copyright term is limited to avoid
'permanently depriv[ing]' the public of 'the fruits of an artist's labors,"' which the CTEA
does not ensure. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228
(1990)).
198. Id. at 262 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 262-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I can find nothing in the Copyright Clause
that would authorize Congress to enhance the copyright grant's monopoly power, likely
leading to higher prices both at home and abroad, solely in order to produce higher
foreign earnings. That objective is not a copyright objective.").
200. Id. at 263 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (interpreting the majority's demographic,
economic and technological concerns as meaning that because "today people
communicate with the help of modern technology, live longer, and have children at a later
age," copyright protection should be lengthened).
201. Id. at 263 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
202. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). In addition, the CTEA extends protection by twenty
years even though the Department of Health and Human Services reported a four-year
increase in expected lifespans between 1976 and 1998. Id.
203. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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After dispensing with each of the majority's arguments, Justice Breyer
addressed the majority's concern that Congress should possess broad
discretion in exercising its Copyright power.05 Although sharing the
majority's concern, Breyer stated that finding the CTEA unconstitutional
would not intrude upon congressional authority because: (1) the CTEA
was not in accord with Copyright Clause objectives; (2) the justifications
were totally implausible; (3) and the CTEA failed to provide the
international uniformity it espoused. 206  Breyer acknowledged the
difficulty in drawing bright lines but explained that the majority could
easily decide "that this particular statute simply goes too far., 27
II. CONGRESS COPYRIGHT POWER Is LIMITED
"The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the [C]onstitution is written.
201
205. Id. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 265 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court should not allow the
Framer's intent to be forgotten just because setting limits is difficult. See Brief for
Petitioner at 19, n.7, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618). Line drawing
problems have always existed, but the Supreme Court has emphasized a categorical limit
to Congress' power. Id. In United States v. Lopez, 574 U.S. 549, 577 (1995), the Court
propounded the fact that a law with no relation to commercial activity is not valid use of
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause. Id. Additionally, in United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000), the Court emphasized that Congress' Commerce
Clause power will only extend to economic activity. Id. CTEA violates the Copyright
Clause to the same extent, if not even more, and thus should be invalidated.
208. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). Eldred v. Ashcroft
concerns a crucial limit on congressional power that the legislature has clearly "forgotten"
and the courts have nearly erased. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999),
affid 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001) and affd sub nom Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003). The Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to "promote the Progress of
Science and the useful Arts." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8. The manner with which to
achieve this goal involves granting "exclusive Right[s]" to "Authors and Inventors" "for
limited Times." Id. The protection afforded serves as a means to the end of allowing
creative works to pass into the public domain "without restraint." Petitioner's Brief at 10,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618) (citing JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 557, at 402-03
(reprinted with introduction by R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987)). However, Congress
has extended copyright protection eleven times, demonstrating its belief that protection is
the primary goal of the Copyright Clause. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 2. The court of
appeals has viewed this unfettered discretion as giving Congress the ability to continue to
act as it has always done. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001). However,
merely because Congress violated the Constitution several previous times without
objection does not grant it unlimited power. Despite the lower courts' holdings in Eldred,
the constitutional restraint is still in place. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8. In fact, the
"limited Times" provision has been established by the Supreme Court as placing limits on
congressional power. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theatre, 604 F.2d
852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); Bonito
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A. The Lower Courts Erred by Relying Upon Unrelated Cases
In finding the CTEA constitutional, the lower courts erred in relying
upon several cases that had little similarity to the present controversy.
9
The cases the lower courts cited did not involve a party challenging
Congress' authority under the Copyright Clause as in Eldred. Sony
involved copyright infringement, Pennock and McClurg involved patent
infringement, and Schnapper dealt with government sponsored
210copyrights. In addition, the cases the lower courts' relied on were
taken out of context and applied to a different type of case-one of first• • 211
impression. Random sentences were extracted from these cases in
support of the proposition that Congress can act without restraint in
exercising its copyright power, as long as it does not permanently extend
212copyright protection. After reading these cases, it becomes evident
211that the lower courts erred in their interpretations of the law.
1. "[C]ongress [Diefines the [S]cope of the [G]rant of [C]opyrights
21 4
The district court in Eldred relied upon the Supreme Court's statement
in Sony explaining that "Congress defines the scope of the grant of
copyrights," as giving Congress unlimited authority with respect to
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)). This overwhelming
acknowledgement of clear limits in the Copyright Clause is no new trend, yet still falls
contrary to the Eldred court's holding. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
209. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3.
210. See id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984); Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829); McClurg v. Kingsland, 42
U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843); Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
211. See Petitioner's Brief at 11, Eldred (No. 01-618). "This Court has never been
called upon to interpret the meaning of "limited Times." Id.
212. Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3 n.7. ("Within the discretion of Congress, any fixed
term is a limited time because it is not perpetual. If a limited time is extended for a limited
time then it remains a limited time.").
213. See Petitioner's Brief at 12, Eldred (No. 01-618) (citing a string of Supreme Court
cases that recognized explicit limits in the use of the copyright power). No other clause in
Article I, § 8 has such a long history of the Supreme Court acknowledging substantive
restraints on Congress' use of this power. Id. (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591
(1834) (rejecting common law copyright); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (holding
trademark law unsupported by Copyright Clause power); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (describing the Copyright Clause as "both a grant of power and a
limitation"); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (rejecting
state law which added patent-type protection); Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (holding "originality" is a constitutional requirement).
214. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999). This quote comes directly
from the Eldred court's text. Id. The court extracted one statement from each of the four
cases cited to reach its determination. Id. Each heading in this section is one of the
sentences relied on by the Eldred court.
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S211
copyright protection. In that case, however, the Supreme Court simply
articulated that Congress has some flexibility in promoting the progress
216of science and the arts. The case did not hold, as the Eldred court
implied, that Congress has unlimited authority to do as it perceives217
necessary. Only within defined limits may Congress grant copyright
218protection.
The district court omitted a limitation on copyright protection
acknowledged by the Court in Sony.219 The Sony Court stated that the
copyright power is not unlimited and that the purpose of offering a
limited grant is to motivate authors and inventors by providing a special
220reward. In addition, the Court noted that the protection afforded is
second to the ultimate goal of public access to the works.221  The district
court erroneously interpreted Sony. A proper reading of Sony
acknowledges that the sole concern was for the public to receive the
222works. Retrospective extensions do not achieve this goal; therefore,neither does the CTEA.223
2. "[T]he [L]imited [T]imes [P]eriod is [Slubject to the [D]iscretion of
Congress
224
The district court's second flaw was its misinterpretation of Pennock &
Sellers v. Dialogue 221-a patent infringement case involving private
215. Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (stating that "it is Congress
that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should
be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their
work product").
216. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
217. Id.
218. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Copyright Clause is not a far-reaching
power. It can be used to "promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [airts," nothing
less, nothing more. Id.
219. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
220. Id.
221. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,
158 (1948)). The Court stated, "'[tihe sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie[s] in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors."' Sony, 464 U.S. at 432 (citing Fox Film
Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (noting that the immediate effect of copyright law
is to secure a fair return for the artists' work, but the ultimate aim is to stimulate creativity
for the greater public good).
222. Sony, 464 U.S. at 432.
223. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(stating that the CTEA does not comply with the Copyright Clause).
224. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (internal quotations
ommitted) affd 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and affd sub nom. Eldred v. Asheroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003).
225. Pennock & Sellers v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
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parties-as giving Congress unlimited discretion in its use of the
226copyright power. However, the Pennock Court, in upholding the first
Patent Act of Congress, merely stated that the limited term granted to
inventors was subject to the discretion of Congress. Pennock has no
bearing on cases involving copyright extensions or claims of
congressional abuse of power as in Eldred.228 Furthermore, the length of
protection afforded at that time was "for a term not exceeding fourteen
years., 229 Interpreted in this light, Pennock says that Congress has some
discretion within the narrow framework of abandoned or dedicated
patents with a fixed term not to exceed fourteen years; thus, the findings
of Pennock have no direct application to this copyright case, where a
constitutional challenge is at issue.230
In fact, the Supreme Court denounced the effects of retrospective
extensions in Pennock.2 1' The Court noted an implicit bargained-for
exchange within the Copyright Clause; if an inventor receives protection
for something already in public use, that grant is not an exchange, but
merely a gift. 232  From the Supreme Court's indication in Pennock,
presumably the High Court would not expand its ruling to laws that far
exceed the original grant of protection of fourteen years, nor to a law
that, by delaying the arrival of new works, essentially acts to remove
works from the public's hands.
226. Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3; Pennock, 27 U.S at 1.
227. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 16-17. The Supreme Court upheld the first Patent Act of
Congress of 1793, which stated that Congress established the procedure for obtaining a
patent, and provided that those decisions were entirely within Congress' discretion. Id. at
17. The Court held that failure to comply with the enunciated procedures bars a claim of
patent infringement. Id. Specifically, plaintiff failed to comply with the Patent Act.
228. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1; Pennock 27, U.S. at 1.
229. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 17.
230. See id. at 1. Pennock should not have been applied to constitutional challenges of
copyright extensions. In addition, Pennock should serve as support for plaintiff's claim
that Congress' copyright power is limited to promoting the progress of science and the
useful arts. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
231. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 23.
232. Id. This type of gift giving is not authorized under the Copyright Clause and
violates the premise of an exchange. See id. "There would be no quid pro quo-no price
for the exclusive right or monopoly conferred upon the inventor for fourteen years." Id.
Although the CTEA does not give protection to works already in public use, the concept
remains relevant. By preventing the public from receiving a work due to revert to the
public domain within a short amount of time, the CTEA essentially takes relied-upon
works out of public use. Despite the district court's determination, Pennock should serve
as support for the plaintiff's argument because the Court clearly recognized a bargained-
for exchange implicit within the Copyright Clause, and the CTEA does not support that
rationale. Id. The Pennock Court stated that "[i]f the public were already in possession
and common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for
presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to
monopolize that which was already common." Id.
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3. "[R]etrospective [L]aws [A]re [P]ermitted"
In McClurg v. Kingsland,"' the Supreme Court noted that in the
confined area of patent infringement, retrospective laws are permitted.23
However, the Eldred Court interpreted this to mean that Congress has
the power to enact retrospective extensions under the Copyright Clause
regardless of the purpose of the law or its effect. 235 The McClurg Court
also stated that objections to retrospective laws cannot be based solely on
their retrospective operation, unless in application they act to take
property rights away from those who own or expect to be able to use
them.2" The CTEA does just that. Its sole effect removes literary
expression from the public domain by delaying its arrival for at least
twenty years; thus, the CTEA's retrospective application is invalid even
under McClurg.237 This serves as another example of how the lower
courts have dissected cases for support, but have taken the holdings out
of context.
2 38
4. "[Tjhe [I]ntroductory [L]anguage of the Copyright Clause [D]oes
[N]ot [L]imit [Congress' Copyright] [P]ower
' 23 9
The lower courts, relying on Schnapper v. Foley, 4 found that "[t]he
introductory language of the copyright clause does not limit this
233. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843).
234. Id. at 206. Although retrospective laws were mentioned in McClurg, the Court
never stated that Congress has the power to enact retrospective copyright extensions. Id.
235. Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999), affd 239 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 2001),
affd sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) ("Congress has authority to enact
retrospective laws under the copyright clause."). The district court cited to McClurg in
making this statement, however, McClurg did not make that assertion. McClurg, 42 U.S.
(1 How) at 206. McClurg stated that Congress has the power to enact retrospective patent
laws. Id. The Copyright Clause was never mentioned nor was any reference made to
copyright extensions. Id. The Supreme Court's assertion in McClurg was made in a
dissimilar context from Eldred, but the district court nonetheless relied on it. Eldred, 74 F.
Supp. 2d at 3.
236. McClurg, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 206. In this case, the Supreme Court referred to
Congress' ability to authorize the issuance of a new patent if the first one was "invalid by
accident, inadvertence, or mistake, and without any fraudulent intent." Id. at 207.
237. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998). Ultimately, there is no concrete difference between preventing the
public from receiving something to which it is entitled, or taking something away from the
public after it has received it.
238. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3; see also Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
239. Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3 n.6 (quoting Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112
(D.C. Cir. 1981)). The district court extracted this sentence from Schnapper, finding the
CTEA constitutional. Id.
240. 667 F.2d 102 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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[copyright] power. , 241 In Schnapper, the court addressed how copyright
242
law applies to government-created works. As argued by Judge
Sentelle, Schnapper only applies to works commissioned by the U.S.
243
Government, if at all. Under this interpretation, Schnapper does not
apply in the instant matter.2
B. Judge Sentelle's Dissent Correctly Asserted That an Unconstitutional
Law in Disguise Is Still Unconstitutional
In his dissent, Judge Sentelle disputed the majority's statement that "if
Congress were to make copyright protection permanent, then it surely
would exceed the power conferred upon it by the Copyright Clause."
245
He argued that allowing Congress an unlimited ability to extend limited
protection produced the same result as giving Congress the authority to
246bestow permanent protection. Sentelle, commenting on the majority's
conception of the "limited Times" provision, stated "[t]his, in my view,
exceeds the proper understanding of enumerated powers reflected in the
Lopez principle of requiring some definable stopping point.,
247
Permanent extension accomplished in any manner is unconstitutional
because it defies and exceeds the understanding of the "limited Times"• • 248
provision. The Supreme Court recognized this principle in Sony;
241. Eldred, 74 F.Supp. 2d at 3 n.6 (citing Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); see also Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2001). If there are no
limits to Congress' power, then why is the "limited Times" provision present in the
Copyright Clause? U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It would have been much simpler for the
Framers to state that Congress has broad authority to encourage literary and scientific
expression, but that is not what the Framers did. After much deliberation, Congress
skillfully placed limitations on the use of the copyright power. See Fenning, supra note 33,
at 112-13 (explaining the historical rationale for Congress' self-imposed limitations on the
copyright power). The Framers limited the scope of the copyright power by: setting a
specific length of time it may grant exclusive rights to authors and inventors, and requiring
the work to seek protection, and to promote the progress of the sciences and arts. Brief
for Petitioner at 15-17, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-618). These
stringent limitations prevent Congress from granting state-backed monopolies or from
using the copyright power as a broad, far-reaching power. Id.
242. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 383.
245. Id. at 377.
246. Id. at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that if Congress "can extend the
protection of an existing work from 100 years to 120 years, [it] can extend that protection
from 120 years to 140; and from 140 to 200; and from 200 to 300; and in effect can
accomplish precisely what the majority admits it cannot do directly").
247. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
248. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 377. The majority acknowledges that permanent protection is
unconstitutional. Id. It makes no legal difference whether an author receives protection
forever through a string of acts or through one act. See id. at 382.
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"Copyright protection is not perpetual, the number of works in the
public domain necessarily increases each year. 249 However, works will
not, and cannot, increase in the public domain through the use of
250retrospective extensions.
The majority in Eldred accepted that the Constitution limits
congressional copyright power. 25' Thus, an act of Congress granting a
permanent term of copyright protection would presumably be held
252unconstitutional. Clearly, Congress knows that the term "limited" is
ambiguous in nature, and thus susceptible to exploitation. 21' However,
prior to its decision in Eldred, the Supreme Court had a long history of
digging below the surface of statutory language and discovering the
25 255ultimate purpose behind a piece of legislation.254 In U.S. v. Lopez, the
249. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 443 n.23
(1984).
250. The Framers hoped that Congress would adopt a rational measure of protection
that would sufficiently encourage creativity and innovation. See Fenning, supra note 33, at
113. After much deliberation, the "limited Times" provision was included. Id. In 1790,
the first Congress limited copyright protection to fourteen years, once renewable. Act of
May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. This first act of Congress should be viewed as the end-all
term for copyright protection because had the Framers wanted terms to be longer, the
First Congress would have done so. It is difficult to imagine that the Framers ever
intended for copyright protection to be extended beyond the initial term. Extensions are
not mentioned in the Copyright Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Eldred,
239 F.3d at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Framers never imagined
permanent protection, either through one stroke of the pen or through unlimited
incremental extensions). Sentelle further stated that Congress was merely given the
power to promote the arts, and their authority to give protection is only a pretext for the
accomplishment of that power. Id. Why would the Framers spend so much time
deliberating over the length of time to be granted if that time could be doubled, tripled or
permanently extended over a series of extensions?
251. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 377.
252. See id. Congress is limited to promoting the progress of the sciences and useful
arts, and because of the "limited Times" provision, Congress cannot grant permanent
protection. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. It is unlikely that any act of Congress would
overtly ignore express limitations. For that reason, it is crucial that the courts take more
than a quick look and find the true intent and effects of a law.
253. This is primarily the reason why the CTEA has not been deemed
unconstitutional. However, this may soon change.
254. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (holding that Congress does not have the power to regulate gender-motivated
violence under the Commerce Clause); Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that
Congress' Commerce Power does not provide the authority to compel the states to enact a
federal regulatory program, and Congress cannot circumvent that restriction by ordering
the State's officers directly); New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress
may not, pursuant to its Commerce Power, commandeer state governments by requiring
them to regulate according to federal guidelines). These prior cases exemplify the
limitations of Congress' power as established by the Supreme Court. The lower courts in
Eldred could just as easily have relied on these Commerce Clause cases in finding for the
plaintiffs, but instead chose to find for the government. See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp.
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Supreme Court recognized limits on Congress' use of the Commerce
Clause.256 Once the Supreme Court established a limit on Congress'
Commerce Clause power, Congress and the lower courts knew the
constitutional scope of Commerce Clause legislation. Both Congress and
the courts need this type of guidance when evaluating Copyright Clause
legislation.
C. The Supreme Court's Decision in Eldred: Justice Stevens' Dissent
Recognized that the Majority Missed its Chance to Set Limits
The majority of the Supreme Court missed its opportunity to define
"limited Times," and thus draw a bright line to prevent this issue from
resurfacing in another twenty years. Instead, the Court opted to use
their rubber stamp, to permit Congress to interpret Article I, section 8,
clause 8 of the Constitution as Congress sees fit.21' The majority's
decision appears short-sighted because it presents an opportunity for
Congress to repeatedly grant extensions to a point that will destroy
creativity. 211 With an ambiguous definition of "limited Times," the scope
of copyright law will haunt future generations. 219  As petitioners
conceded, there was never a question of whether this practice existed; the
relevant question was whether the Supreme Court would resolve it, or at
260
least define a stopping point.
2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999), affd 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), affd sub nom. Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); see also Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d. 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
255. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Supreme Court invalidated the Gun Free School Zones
Act of 1990, which made carrying a gun in a school zone a federal offense. Id. at 551
256. Id. at 558-59. The court determined that Congress' power is limited to activities
that implicate: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce; and (3) activities having a substantial relationship to interstate commerce. Id.
257. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003).
258. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 241-42 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(recognizing the need for a "categorical rule" prohibiting retrospective extensions).
Stevens stated, "unless the [Copyright] Clause is construed to embody such a categorical
rule, Congress may extend existing monopoly privileges ad infinitum under the majority's
analysis." Id. at 242. From Stevens' statements, it is evident that without a defined limit
or stopping point, Congress has no explicit limit on its ability to extend protection until
informed otherwise. See id.
259. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
260. See Brief for Petitioners at 9, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-
618) (stating that this case is about "one important limit on the legislature's power that
Congress has clearly 'forgotten'). The Petitioners further stated, "Congress has now
found a way to evade this constitutional restraint. Rather than granting authors a fixed...
term of copyright, Congress has repeatedly extended the terms of existing copyrights-
eleven times in the past forty years." Id. at 10.
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The majority of the Supreme Court opted against a careful analysis of.-. 261
the Copyright Clause, as urged by petitioners. The majority took the
road traveled by the lower courts, rather than create its own path with
162
which they could guide Congress. In supporting the lower courts'
findings, the majority also determined that the first Copyright Act of
263
1790 was a retrospective extension. However, as Judge Sentelle and
Justice Stevens stated in their respective dissents, the first Copyright Act
of 1790 created a new federal copyright that replaced existing state
copyrights; it did not extend existing copyrights, as claimed by the
majority.2 4  In propelling this myth, the majority failed to offer any
rationale of how the Framers could have established federal recognition
of copyrights without supplanting the existing state copyrights. As
support for its conclusion, the majority added that Congress has
266historically enacted retroactive copyright legislation. However, the fact
that Congress has consistently violated the Constitution does not mean it
267may continue to do so. As the court of last resort, the Supreme Court
268has a duty to strike down legislation that is unconstitutional. When the
261. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 207-08 (2003). The majority declined to
scrutinize the CTEA, stating, "we are not at liberty to second-guess congressional
determinations and policy judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise
they may be." Id. at 208.
262. Id. at 212-13. The majority of the Supreme Court mirrored the majority of the
court of appeals, stating that it is not the Court's role to decide Congress' role under the
Copyright Clause. See id.; see also Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
263. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 196; see also Eldred, 239 F.3d at 374.
264. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 384 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at
231 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
265. See Eldred, 537 U.S. 1126 n.3 (acknowledging the dispute over whether the Act of
1790 should be distinguished from later acts, but stating that "[w]ithout resolving that
dispute, we underscore that the First Congress clearly did confer copyright protection on
works that had already been created.").
266. See id. at 200-01.
267. Id. at 235 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that notwithstanding the fact that
Congress has repeatedly acted on a mistaken interpretation of the Constitution, the
Court's duty to invalidate a unconstitutional practice remains).
26& See Brief for Petitioner at 18-19, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No. 01-
618) (stating that the Supreme Court should find the CTEA unconstitutional as it did with
Commerce Clause legislation in Lopez and Morrison); see also United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000). The Supreme
Court could have drafted a non-retroactive ruling, thereby pacifying concerns that
previous congressional extensions were unconstitutional. Justice Breyer expressed his
concern that a ruling against the CTEA could affect previous copyright extensions.
Eldred, 534 U.S. at 265. "The chaos that would ensue would be horrendous." See also
Andy Sullivan, Mickey Mouse Copyright Case Hits U.S. Supreme Court,
http://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/dmca-activists/2002-10/msgOO016.html, (Oct. 9, 2002).
O'Connor stated, "I can find a lot of fault with what Congress did here, because it takes a
lot of things out of the public domain.' 'It's longer than one would think desirable, but is it
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High Court avoids taking a stand, as it did here, Congress wins at the
expense of the public.
After laying such an unsupported foundation, the majority stated that
regardless of any constitutional limits, fairness and equity must dictate
the result.26 9 Therefore, the majority premised, yesterday's author should
not receive less protection than tomorrow's author, simply because
Congress decided to lengthen protection today."7  However, there are
problems associated with retroactively extending the length of protection
previously granted to authors.27' One problem arises because an author
entered into a contractual agreement with the public whereby he was
granted a limited period of protection, and in exchange, the public
received a future interest in his creation. By extending his protection,
not limited?' Id. Despite the fact that some Justices acknowledged that the CTEA was
bad public policy, the Court failed to fulfill its role as the Court of last resort. "Any
Supreme Court ruling on the regulation of cyberspace will set a course that will be hard to
undo." See Susanna Frederick Fischer, Book Review: Crusading Against the Dinosaurs: A
Review of The Future of Ideas, By Lawrence Lessig, 10 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 251
(2001).
269. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204 (quoting 7 CONG. DEB. 424 (1831) (statement of Rep.
Huntington)) (stating that "'[j]ustice, policy, and equity alike forb[id]' that an 'author who
had sold his [work] a week ago, be placed in a worse situation ... "' than the author who
sells his work today).
270. Id. Although fairness and equity are important concerns of any court, it seems as
though the majority is trying to justify an extension on the remote possibility that some
unwary author may publish his work a day before Congress extends protection. See id.
However, for the most part, the CTEA benefits copyright holders like Walt Disney who
published their works over seventy years ago, not one day before the passage of the
CTEA. See James Surowiecki, Righting Copywrongs, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?talk/020121ta- talk-surowiecki, THE NEW
YORKER, Jan. 14, 2002 (stating that Mickey made his screen debut in 1928 and his
copyright was due to expire in 2003). The majority's concern, if sincere, could be assuaged
through a congressional act making any copyright extension applicable to all works
published in close proximity to the passage of the copyright legislation, rather than
granting blanket protection to all authors and inventors, regardless of when they were
initially published. This legislation would ensure fairness while ensuring that intellectual
progress will be promoted through the secondary use of public domain works. This goal
makes the most sense given the fact that copyright law was designed "'primarily for the
benefit of the public,' for 'the benefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate
writing and invention."' Eldred, 537 U.S. at 247 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP
No. 60-2222, at 6-7 (1909)). Because it is evident that this is the foremost consideration
under the Copyright Clause, the CTEA is clearly not the choice of the public, and thus
should not be the choice of any representative Congress.
271. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating "[t]he issuance of a
patent is appropriately regarded as a quid pro quo"). Stevens commented on the effect of
modifying a bargained for exchange in favor of one party after the agreement has already
been ratified. Id. at 266.
272. See id. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (elaborating on the concept of quid pro quo,
Justice Stevens stated that it is "the grant of a limited right for the inventor's disclosure
and subsequent contribution to the public domain").
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Congress has authorized the author to breach that contract with the
public.273 Justice Stevens argued that it is "manifestly unfair" for
Congress to alter an agreement in favor of one party after the other party
274has relied upon it to their detriment. The Supreme Court should have
limited Congress' ability to alter the terms of its contract.275
An additional problem with the majority's finding is that it violates theC1 276
quid pro quo inherent in the Copyright Clause. It gives the author
additional protection, but the public receives nothing in exchange.277 By
the majority's reasoning, the public may be disadvantaged as long as the
author receives the prevailing term of protection.278 Justice Stevens
stated that in order for the majority's theory to be accepted, two
untenable assumptions must be made. 279 First, "that the public interest in
free access to copyrighted works is entirely worthless," and second, as a
class, authors and inventors "should receive a windfall solely based on
completed creative activity. '" 28  Despite the majority's willingness to
make these assumptions, the public, as a party to this contract, is not.
In finding that the CTEA is rationally related to the purpose of the
Copyright Clause, the majority acknowledged that the primary purpose
of the CTEA is "to ensure that American authors would receive the
same copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts."'28'
As a secondary consideration, the majority noted that the CTEA "may
also provide greater incentive for American and other authors to create"
273. See id. at 225 (stating that the obligation of contracts should prevent Congress, or
anyone, from altering an agreement without providing compensation for the taking).
274. Id.
275. See Andy Sullivan, Mickey Mouse Copyright Case Hits U.S. Supreme Court,
http://mail.gnu.org/archive/html/dmca-activists/2002-10/msgOO016.html (Oct. 9, 2002).
During the Supreme Court arguments for this case, Justice Scalia, a member of the
majority, seemed to have trouble stomaching retrospective extensions. Id. "Justice
Antonin Scalia questioned why Congress needed to include existing works when it decided
to [extend] copyright laws." Id. Scalia asked how granting an additional twenty years of
protection to works already created encouraged artists to produce new work. Id. Scalia
further asked, "Why is it inequitable if they get what they're entitled to at the time they
make the work?". This demonstrates that members of the Supreme Court agreed that
retrospective extensions are not in accord with the Copyright Clause.
276. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 231 n.7 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging the existence of a quid pro quo in the Copyright Clause).
277. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title I, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998). The Act extends protection to copyright holders, without benefitting
the public.
278. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204. The obvious problem with this is that the public
receives nothing in exchange for the gift given to the author or copyright holder.
279. See id. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 205-06 ("The CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes,
judgments [the Supreme Court] cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature's domain.").
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and restore older works.282 Although harmonizing protection afforded to
authors may seem like a worthy cause under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, any act of Congress pursuant to the Copyright Clause must aim
to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. ' 83 Evidently this is
not the primary consideration of the CTEA, and it is unlikely that
granting authors an additional twenty years of protection will provide
any additional incentive, the Act should have been found "manifestly
unconstitutional.284
Furthermore, the majority supported Congress' finding that the CTEA
"[will] encourage copyright holders to invest in the restoration and ...
distribution of [older] works., 28 5 However, the restoration of an existing
work does not promote any new creation or intellectual progress, and
any original creation occurring in the restoration process would receive
new copyright protection without the CTEA This further
demonstrates the weakness in the majority's justification for the CTEA.
For these reasons, the CTEA is not in accord with the Copyright Clause;
thus, it is unconstitutional.
The majority conceded that the CTEA may not be wise public policy.
Nevertheless, the majority upheld the lower courts' decisions, finding
that it is not the role of the Supreme Court to "alter the delicate balance
Congress has labored to achieve. 287 Such a holding seems contrary to
Chief Justice Marshall's statement in Marbury v. Madison, that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
282. Id. at 206.
283. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224-25 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 (Pet) 1 (1829)).
284. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 226-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens articulated
the basic tenets of the Copyright Clause, stating that any act of Congress pursuant to the
Copyright Clause must encourage new inventions by granting limited protection, and as an
overriding interest, the act must advance progress by ensuring that these protected works
will within a limited time fall into the public domain. Id. at 227. Stevens concluded his
argument by stating that neither of these goals are accomplished by retrospectively
increasing an inventor's compensation for a completed invention. Id. at 226. If anything,
retrospective extensions hamper intellectual progress and creativity because the legitimate
expectations of members of the public who want to make use of works scheduled to enter
the public domain are frustrated when the works remain protected. Id. at 226-27.
285. Id. at 207.
286. Id. at 239.
287. Id. at 208-14 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990)).
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what the law is. ' '188  In deciding to do nothing, the majority allowedCongress to take what it did not possess at the public's expense.2 89
D. Justice Breyer's Dissent: A Different Approach
Justice Breyer correctly stated that the CTEA is not rationally related
to a legitimate Copyright Clause interest. 29°  Breyer's argument is
comprised of essentially three findings: (1) the benefits bestowed by the
CTEA are private rather than public, contrary to the Framers' intent; (2)
the CTEA "threatens seriously to undermine the expressive values that
the Copyright Clause embodies"; and (3) the CTEA does not have any
justification in a Copyright Clause-related objective.
Justice Breyer correctly asserted that the CTEA does little for the
292public as a whole. The CTEA blocks the public's ability to use these
copyrighted works and costs the public billions of dollars in royalties.9
Breyer then demonstrated that the CTEA is not in accord with the
294Copyright Clause's mandated requirement of limited protection. The
effect of the CTEA in economic terms thereby grants authors 99.8% of
protection in perpetuity-in violation of the Constitution -because less
288. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See Eldred, 537 U.S. at
242 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that Congress' actions under the Copyright Clause
are judicially unreviewable, runs counter to the Constitution and Chief Justice John
Marshall's statement in Marbury v. Madison).
289. Instead of setting limits and giving Congress some guidance, the majority, by
merely finding the CTEA constitutional, did little but postpone this controversy for
another twenty years.
290. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The separate dissenting
opinions assumed different positions in finding the CTEA unconstitutional. See id. at 242-
48 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 222-243 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens'
dissent disposed with each argument put forth by the majority, whereas Justice Breyer's
economic approach relied upon statistics in finding that the CTEA fails rational basis
scrutiny. See id. at 242-249 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 222-43 (Stevens, J.
dissenting). Although the analysis of the majority dominates the presenatation of Justice
Stevens' dissent in this article, there are sections of the dissent that should be considered
independently.
291. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 243 (stating that the practical effect of the CTEA is to inhibit the progress
of science). Breyer also classified the benefits bestowed as private rather than public. Id.
at 245.
293. Id. at 248-49 (stating that the extra twenty years of protection meant that the
transfer of billions of dollars from the hands of the public into the hands of copyright
holders). Breyer also stated a purported well-established proposition, that "[N]ew,
cheaper editions can be expected when works come out of copyright," and consequently
higher prices ensue when works remain protected). See id. at 261 (alteration in original).
294. Id. at 256.
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than 0.2% of copyrighted works retain their commercial value after
seventy-five years."'
Justice Breyer then countered all the majority's claims supporting
Congress. 296 First, he asserted that the harmonization rationale was a
mere fallacy.297  The CTEA does not harmonize U.S. copyright
protection with European protection on two out of three fronts, and even
if it did, international harmonization is not a stated goal or consideration
of the Copyright Clause.298 Secondly, in response to Congress' claims
that the CTEA ensures equal protection for American authors in
Europe, and has positive balance of trade affects, Breyer asserted that
these were not valid reasons for justifying an act of Congress under the
Copyright Clause.2 99 The problems associated with permitting the use of
the Copyright Clause or any power of Congress for unintended purposes
is obvious. If permitted, there will never be a definable stopping point,
thus the measurable effects will be that the copyright power will
transform into an all-purpose power, in conflict with the Constitution. If
it is so obvious that "there is no legitimate, serious copyright-related
justification for this statute,''300 as stated by Justice Breyer, then why did
the majority uphold the CTEA? The Court's holding indicated a
position not to vere from traditional precedent; and in doing so, it
strayed from constitutional principles.
III. IMPLICATIONS: THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING ELIMINATED THE
LIMITATIONS PRESENT IN THE COPYRIGHT CLAUSE (PROTECTION
GRANTED MUST PROMOTE PROGRESS AND BE LIMITED IN DURATION)
A. The Supreme Court Breached Its Duty
The Copyright Clause is one of few clauses of the Constitution with
expressed structural limitations, which are explicit in the "limited Times"
295. See id. at 254-56.
296. Id. at 254-63.
297. Id. at 257-58.
298. Id. First, the CTEA provides ninety-five years of protection for works made "for
hire" and all existing works created prior to 1978, whereas European copyrights provide
between fifty to seventy years of protection for "for hire" works. Id. Second, the CTEA
and European law conflict in terms of the rights extended to anonymous and
pseudonymous works. Id. Third, the CTEA does provide uniformity with respect to
works created post 1977 by natural persons. Id. Breyer contended that "[a] rational
legislature could not give major weight to an invisible, likely non existent incentive-related
effect." Id. at 259. Alternatively, Breyer asserted that even if the CTEA harmonized U.S
copyright law with that of the European Union, it does not help to justify the statute
pursuant to the Copyright Clause, which only considers the promotion of creation. Id. at
260.
299. Id. at 262-63.
300. Id. at 263.
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provision, and implicit through the limited purpose of promoting
progress.•01 Implicit limitations have been found in the Commerce
Clause despite the lack of explicit limitations.3°' This demonstrates that
when Congress overtly abuses its authority, the Supreme Court has a
duty to intervene and declare the act unconstitutional. 3  Although the
Supreme Court chose to do nothing, it had an obligation to stop
Congress from overextending its use of the Copyright Clause, as it did
regarding the Commerce Clause in Lopez and Morrison.3°,
B. Implications: Taking the "limited" out of "limited Times"
Many prominent judges, scholars and intellectuals have noted that
defined boundaries are crucial to the longevity of a fruitful public
domain. Otherwise, Congress has unlimited power.3° The implications
301. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In his dissent, Judge Sentelle stated, "[e]xtending
existing copyrights is not promoting useful arts, nor is it securing exclusivity for a limited
time." Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
302. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995) ("[C]ongressional power
under the Commerce Clause . . . is subject to outer limits."). These "outer limits" were
found despite any express limitation on Congress' power, unlike those found in the
Copyright Clause. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 381 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that this
"outer limits" theory applies to the Copyright Clause as well as every other power).
303. In the case of the Copyright Clause, the need for judicial action is even greater
because Congress is ignoring explicit limitations on its power. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8. The Commerce Clause does not impose express limitations on Congress' use. The
limitations found were implicit. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." From the
text of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court determined that Congress' power is
limited to activities that implicate (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2)
instrumentalities of interstate commerce; and (3) activities having a substantial
relationship to interstate commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
304. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610
(2000).
305. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 381 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (expressing the need for
"outer limits" to be applied to the Copyright Clause). See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d
1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999), affd 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003). Without clear boundaries, Congress' power is unlimited, according to the
district court. See id. Because of the lack of demarcated boundaries, Congress has been
given the freedom to extend protection whenever it wants as long as some purpose is
given. See id. See also Lessig, supra note 5, at 203. "'An expansion of copyright
protection,' . . . might . . . reduce the output of literature . . . by increasing the royalty
expense of writers."' Id. (quoting Judge Richard Posner). Lessig further states that
reaching the right balance between protecting and encouraging creation cannot be found
by expanding the ability of copyright holders to control output. Id. Judge Alex Kozinski
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dissented from the majority's holding in Vanna
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (1993). Id. Judge Kozinski stated,
"Something very dangerous is going on here. Private property, including
intellectual property, is essential to our way of life. It provides an
incentive for investment and innovation; it stimulates the flourishing of
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of the Supreme Court's ruling are obvious.0 7 First, Congress remains
unchecked in the use of its copyright power and can continue to lengthen
the term of protection extended because, as the majority of the high
Court stated, "it is not [the Court's] role to alter the delicate balance
Congress has labored to achieve., 30 8 Secondly, because of the ambiguity
over the length of "limited Times," Congress has no guidance in
determining a stopping point.3°9 Third, because of intense lobbying
efforts, works with commercial value will seldom enter the public
domain, and as a result, the public domain will become stagnant and
inevitably useless. "0 Fourth, and most critical, the progression of
our culture; it protects the moral entitlements of people to the fruits of
their labors. But reducing too much to private property can be bad
medicine."
Id.
306. See Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3. Because the Supreme Court failed to define
Congress' "outer limits," the public domain will become even more depleted and
retrospective extensions could become even more frequent. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995). See also Eldred, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 3 n.7 (stating that as long as
Congress did not permanently extend protection, any number of incremental extensions
would be a constitutionally permissible "limited Time").
307. Eldred, 239 F.3d at 382 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The court quoted Lopez, 514
U.S. at 564, commenting on the broad implications that the CTEA would have:
"Thus, if we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without
power to regulate.' I fear that the rationale offered by the government for
the copyright extension, as accepted by the district court and the majority,
leads to such an unlimited view of the copyright power as the Supreme
Court rejected with reference to the Commerce Clause in Lopez."
Id.
This rationale is similar to the one put forth by the 1976 Congress, demonstrating its
potential for further use. See Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in
Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1995). The Copyright Act of 1976
considered the harmonization of United States copyright law with that of other countries
as a mere secondary consideration. See id. The primary goal was to promote creation by
striking a balance between protection and public accessibility to the work. See id. The
1976 Act had many other components beneficial to copyright law, unlike the CTEA,
which primarily served to harmonize the United States with the European Union. See id.
308. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212-13 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230
(1990)).
309. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
310. The harmonization rationale is merely a front for the primary goal of raising
campaign funds. See Knudsen, supra note 16, at 21-22. (asserting that Disney's copyrights
were a major, though unstated concern of Congress in enacting the CTEA because of
political donations made by the company). See James Surowiecki, Righting Copywrongs,
at http://www.newyorker.com/printable/talk/020121tatalk-surowiecki, (Jan. 14, 2002)
("Walt Disney Company pulled off a nifty legal heist."). Nearly every time a Disney
character is close to entering the public domain, copyright terms are extended. Id. A few
years ago, the copyrights to Pluto, Goofy and Donald Duck were near expiration, so
Disney started an aggressive lobbying scheme. Id. After spending $342,000 in campaign
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intellectual advancement and creativity may decline. By the time an
invention is given to the public for free use, it will have lost most, if not
all, commercial value and will be deemed irrelevant.3 '
In addition to these logical implications, there may be some
unforeseen problems that arise. The Supreme Court stated that the
CTEA may encourage creativity, but its primary purpose is to harmonize
U.S. copyright laws with those laws in Europe. 312 Thus, Congress may
use Eldred as precedent for its unbridled use of the copyright power,
transforming it into an all-purpose power. Although one would hope
that the Supreme Court would overturn any unconstitutional use of the
Copyright Clause, this is no longer clear. Because the Supreme Court
provided no guidance to Congress in its use of the Copyright Clause, and
it is unlikely that Congress will independently re-draft copyright
legislation,"' this dilemma will inevitably arise again, and haunt
314generations to come.
contributions, Disney was able to divert the loss for another twenty years. See Knudsen,
supra. The sooner the Supreme Court labels a spade a spade, the closer the public will be
to receiving their bargained-for exchange. See Eldred, 239 F.3d at 382 (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting) (stating that Congress was merely given the power to promote the arts, and
their authority to give protection is only a pretext for the accomplishment of that power).
Congress is limited in the use of its copyright power. See id. Any use must conform to the
stated objective. See id. Sentelle concluded his argument by propounding the fact that the
government has never offered any legitimate theory on how retrospective extensions are
promoting the useful arts. Id.
311. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
312. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205-06 (2003). See Patrick Haggerty, The
Constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 70 U. CIN. L.
REV. 651, 660 (2002)(noting that Congress passed the CTEA primarily because it believed
that U.S. copyright law should be the same as in Europe, which is life plus seventy years).
From a constitutional viewpoint, there is no real downfall to offering U.S. authors twenty
years less protection then offered in Europe. See id. at 660. In Europe, specifically under
the "rule of the shorter term" provision, "member states [would] recognize copyrights in
foreign works for only as long as the work would be protected in its own country, or the
European Community term, whichever is shorter." Id. Proponents of the CTEA argued
that authors would lose revenue if not given the same protection afforded to European
authors. Id. However, proponents failed to realize, and Congress failed to inform them,
that the Copyright Clause is not concerned with the distribution of profits to authors and
inventors. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The sole purpose of the Copyright Clause is
to promote scientific and intellectual progress, a goal that is not being achieved under the
European Directive or the CTEA. See id.
313. The uncertainty surrounding congressional copyright authority provides a
compelling reason for Congress to draft new legislation that is reflective of the limitations
of the Copyright Clause. Although this is unlikely to occur in the near future, some
proposals have been suggested. The copyright legislation should apply only to new works
thereby redefining the length of protection once and for all. The ultimate goal of this
copyright legislation must be to encourage production while simultaneously enriching the
public domain. This "delicate balance" can easily be achieved by offering creators a
reasonable payoff for their labor, so that they will be compensated, while also ensuring the
[Vol. 53:161
Promoting Progress Through Perpetual Protection
IV. CONCLUSION
The petitioners in Eldred lost the battle and as a result, Congress
remains undefeated in its journey to perpetually extend copyright
protection. Until Congress' next attempt to extend copyright protection,
works' timely arrival into the public domain. Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
Lawrence Lessig, a "freedom fighter" for the information age, suggests a radical
approach to copyright law. Fischer, supra note 268, at 251. Lessig's proposal, as he
acknowledges, is "neither complete nor certain." Id. at 261 (citing LAWRENCE LESSIG,
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 240
(2001)). Lessig's proposal is revolutionary in application, but because of its proposed
drastic changes is unlikely to be implemented. See Fischer supra note 268, at 250-52.
Interestingly, his proposal comes much closer to the first Act of 1790 in duration, and for
that reason, a more favorable system of protection than the CTEA. See id. Lessig refers
to current copyright law as a "black hole" because protection extends well over a century
regardless of whether the protection still benefits the author. Id. at 251. His solution to
this "black hole" is to essentially force those who reap the benefits of copyright protection
to actively maintain their protection. Id. at 251-52. Under Lessig's proposal, the
protection initially granted to authors and inventors would be for a five-year term, with
the option of renewal fifteen times. Id. If the author does not renew the work, then it falls
into the public domain. Id. The major problems with Lessig's proposal are: (1) it offers
extremely short terms; (2) it encourages inefficiency with frequent renewal requirements;
(3) courts will be inundated with non-compliance issues; and (4) it does not ensure that the
author will receive protection for his life, as ensured under the 1976 Act.
Congress should enact copyright legislation that initially grants authors and
inventors a fourteen-year term that automatically renews at the end of the term for the life
of the author or inventor. This proposal aligns with the first Congress, but also takes into
account that individuals live longer today than in 1790. It also escapes the pitfalls of
Lessig's proposal because the creator essentially receives a life estate in his or her
creation, which shall be no less than fourteen years, as under the Act of 1790. The intent
of the Copyright Clause is upheld because of the term's basic limitation to a life estate, but
the author is guaranteed fourteen years if he dies before the first term's expiration. In
order to promote efficiency, no renewal requirements apply. Ultimately, this proposal is
not trying to balance the interests of today's protection-driven Congress. This proposal is
concerned with three things: (1) upholding the text of the Constitution; (2) remaining
consistent with the first Act of Congress; and (3) understanding that individuals have
longer life spans.
In order to encourage authors, inventors, and other copyright holders to donate
their works to the public domain for others to expand upon, incentives must exist.
Currently, the Internal Revenue Service allows individuals to take tax deductions for
donations made to charitable institutions. Similiar deductions should be offered to
copyright holders, so the public domain will grow more rapidly.
314. See Br. of Amici Curiae Progressive Intellectual Property Law Ass'n, at 9-10,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 534 U.S. 1126 (2002) (No.01-618) (2002). The potential problems were
evidenced by statements made by Sonny Bono's widow, while she was serving the
remainder of his term, upon the presentation of the CTEA: "Actually, Sonny wanted
copyright to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all
ways available to us. As you know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal to last forever less
one day. Perhaps the committee may look at that next Congress." Id.
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the true effects of the Supreme Court's decision remain unknown.
Hopefully, at that time, the Supreme Court will be composed of Justices
committed to checking Congress' copyright authority, rather than those
who defer so readily to Congress in copyright law expansion. Until that
day comes, the public domain will remain stagnant and unable to nurture
the creativity of those waiting to derivatively use the works of others.
